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Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S.
IMET Training and Its Role in Internal
Defense and Development

William H. McCoy, Jr.

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Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development

William H. McCoy, Jr.

Prepared for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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Preface

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." The purpose of the project is to assess the effectiveness of programs to train U.S. students in foreign internal defense (FID) and foreign students in internal defense and development (IDAD), to examine the benefits that the United States derives from these programs, and to consider how future efforts can be improved and strengthened.

This Note is one of four documents presenting the results of six comparative case studies prepared as part of the second phase of the project. These regional case studies—which embrace El Salvador and Honduras, Thailand and the Philippines, and, in this Note, Senegal and Liberia—examine the effectiveness of U.S. training of international military students in promoting human rights, professionalism, democratic values, national development, and appropriate civil-military relations. Specifically, they consider whether training within the United States and in the host countries themselves achieves these objectives. This Note is intended to be of interest to government and military officials concerned with U.S. military aid to, and training of, the militaries of countries in the less-developed world. Note that the research for this Note was completed in July 1992 and therefore is current only until that time.

The project's final phase was completed in November 1992 and provides general recommendations for improving the organization, dispensation, doctrine, and focus of future U.S. FID and IDAD training efforts, along with specific recommendations for the key countries identified in the case studies. Previous project publications include the following:

- Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy, Jr., *International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics*, RAND, N-3634-USDP, 1993.
- Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Thailand and the Philippines: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development*, RAND, MR-159-USDP, 1994.
- Michael T. Childress, *The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development: The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras*, RAND, MR-250-USDP, forthcoming.

- Jennifer Morrison Taw, *The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development: Executive Summary*, RAND, MR-172-USDP, 1993.

The research presented here was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was carried out within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

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Summary

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." The purpose of the project is to assess the effectiveness of programs to train U.S. students in foreign internal defense (FID)¹ and foreign students in internal defense and development (IDAD),² to examine the benefits that the United States derives from these programs, and to consider how future efforts can be improved and strengthened.

This Note compares and contrasts U.S. training programs in Liberia and Senegal. Specifically, it examines the history, background, and internal defense and development issues; the strategic importance of the two nations that resulted in U.S. involvement there; and the training programs the United States has provided for the purpose of improving those nations' internal defense and [internal] development.

The Note then examines the specific IDAD requirements for each of the nations and, on the basis of those requirements, assesses the value of current training and postulates specific issues that should be addressed in order to improve each nation's IDAD. It also examines the utility of the expanded International Military Education and Training (IMET-E) program, which is designed to broaden training to relevant civilian members of foreign governments in particular courses of study so that they can develop a better understanding of civil-military operations, programming and budgeting, the judicial system, and human rights.

¹*Foreign internal defense* is the "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency." Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Joint Publication 1-02, December 1969, p. 15⁰. In the context of this study, FID is those actions taken by the United States in support of other nations' internal defense and development.

²*Internal defense and development* is "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 5 December 1990, p. GLOSSARY-5.

The Value of Training

Training of foreign military students is a means of enhancing military-to-military relationships, fostering self-reliance, and developing a better understanding of internationally recognized human rights. Training provides the United States with the opportunity to build rapport with foreign militaries and to develop a common method of operation in case it is needed. For instance, such relationships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Senegal, and Pakistan facilitated the formation of a capable and combat-ready international coalition against Iraq in 1990. While most agree that IMET is a low-cost, high-payoff form of aid, which by and large seems to perform admirably and provide what the United States intends, unfortunately, it has not always been successful. However, in those situations where U.S. national policy or training objectives are not achieved in a country, training in and of itself is rarely the sole reason for the failure.

Liberia: A Training Failure

The Liberian military, despite years of U.S. aid in the 1980s, the training of over 300 students in America, and the deployment of over 20 Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to provide much-needed training in individual and unit skills, still failed to perform at a critical time in its history in 1989, when the civil war in that country began. The result now is that the country is a shambles and will require total reconstruction. And the military is all but destroyed.

Clear signals were sent throughout the 1980s that the training program was not succeeding and, in fact, that President Doe did not want it to succeed because of the threat it would have posed to him. MTT team chiefs continuously stated that their efforts were not changing the state of readiness of the Liberian military. Students trained in the United States were not being utilized effectively upon their return to Liberia to provide improvement to a seriously degrading military. The very lack of a coherent training plan, or involvement in developing one, by the Liberian military should have signaled to the U.S. Embassy a definite lack of commitment to sincere development by the government. At the point when war began in 1989, Doe and the Liberian military failed to take actions deemed essential to quell the small insurgent uprising—despite advice from the United States. The result was the overthrow of the Doe regime.

Unfortunately, after almost three years, a bloody civil war continues as National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) leader Charles Taylor, now with a force of approximately 10,000 mostly out-of-control Liberian teenagers, adopts and emulates the same corruption, greed, and intransigence that characterized the

despot he sought to overthrow. Meanwhile, almost 30,000 Liberians have died—the vast majority civilian—and almost half of the population has been uprooted in what is now regarded as one of the bloodiest wars in African history.

The threat to Liberia and the region was extensive. Although the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been somewhat successful in corralling most of the belligerents, Charles Taylor continued to control the majority of the country outside Monrovia and, it is believed, with external support, continues to fight even though he has said he would honor the peace and disarmament accords.

Without total commitment to reform by the Liberian government and a sincere desire to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the country, any action the United States takes, if it decides to help, will not solve Liberia's problems. (Some recommended actions for Liberia, based on the research and analysis contained in this Note, are found on pages 26–33.) Even with that commitment, such actions may not succeed. If the United States is indeed interested in helping Liberia to evolve into a more stable society, it must be prepared to assist in a way that is more involved than in the past. A more involved form of assistance—consisting of a combined and prudent attempt by the two countries to move forward toward a secure and stable democracy—will be essential for Liberia to reverse its course.

Senegal: A Training Success

Senegal is a good example of an emerging democracy. It plays a major role in maintaining regional stability and has substantial influence and stature with its neighbors. A well-trained military contributes, as a disciplined member of the federal government, toward national development and, at the same time, provides a stabilizing factor both within the country and in the region. With a relatively small program from the United States, the Senegalese military has been able to take advantage of the best the U.S. military has to offer, its participation ranging from enrollment in in-country branch advanced courses to attendance at various U.S. military academies.

The Senegalese military is active in IDAD and believes that one of its principal missions is to participate in the development of its nation because of the poverty in Senegal—it can be no other way. The military engineer works on projects that benefit both the military and the civilian populace throughout the country. The military medical department constitutes one-third of the medical capability of Senegal. And the training provided to the military, both by the United States and by others, provides a basis for improving the professionalism and capabilities of

the force. The Senegalese military commented specifically that it prefers the U.S. style of training over that provided by others because it is more interactive and allows for specific training to standard in subjects the military requires. The military there is active in the development of the U.S. training program and regards U.S. training at Continental U.S. (CONUS)-based schools as a key component in the career development of its officer corps.

In the years that follow, IMET and other forms of U.S. training will continue to contribute to success or improvements in IDAD enjoyed by Senegal. Future training strategies of both military and civilian personnel should focus on those areas with which the country is struggling, such as its economic growth needs, its *gendarmerie*, and specific types of training and programs that will ultimately improve the living conditions and overall satisfaction of the Senegalese people. Some recommended actions for Senegal, based on the research and analysis contained in this Note, are found on pages 53-55.

Should the United States Train in Nation-Building?

A question that has been the subject of considerable debate is, Does internal defense and development training to the military hinder development of a country?³ Although in many situations it may be problematic, in Africa, where most countries have barely enough food to feed themselves and where many people go without shelter and food, military training in internal development provides an aspect of hope. Through cooperative programs such as civic action, in which the host-nation military works with the U.S. military to provide a service or a facility for the civilians that will improve their immediate or long-term living conditions, training improves the host nation's ability to provide for its people. Training in the United States in engineering, medicine, signals and communication, and transportation provides improvements in the professionalism of the military. When the soldier returns home, he is more capable of responding to the needs of his people in a professional, competent way. And when he leaves military service, he has acquired a skill that, if utilized, serves to improve the community.

Of course, for IDAD to succeed, two fundamental requirements must be met. First, the government must be committed to its success. Second, if the military is

³There is much evidence to suggest that certain militaries without a firm foundation in "service to nation," or militaries in countries with weak civilian leadership, may use IDAD training for individual benefit or to strengthen the military's control over its government. See Schwarz, Benjamin C., *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4042-USDP, 1992.

to participate in IDAD, it must understand what its role and position in the government are and must abide by that understanding.

The first requirement may sound like rhetoric, but it is clear that, while Senegal is committed, Liberia was not. Corruption and ethnic discrimination by the government were clear signals that Liberia was not interested in improving the living conditions for more than a select few. In situations such as these, the United States must be prepared to take firm action to ensure that the host government clearly understands the consequences of lack of progress toward internal defense and development.

As to the second requirement of military participation, again the contrast between Senegal and Liberia is extraordinary. Senegal's military believes that its fundamental role is to participate in the development of Senegal—not for its own betterment but for the betterment of the Senegalese. It also understands that it is only one of the many participants involved in IDAD there. From Senegal's perspective, training in management and professional skills serves to contribute immediately and ultimately to its internal defense and development. With regard to Liberia, training it to implement an effective IDAD strategy may be critical to its future.

IMET-E in Africa

The expanded IMET program will ultimately enhance the training of selected individuals in Africa.⁴ Currently, in many countries there is a poor understanding of the role and position of the military—on the part of both the military and the civilians in government. Human rights and judicial reform are essential in a number of countries. Financial management and better management of the defense establishments of these small countries are critical.

However, as important as these types of programs are, instruction in tactics, strategy, and other defense issues is just as important to African military leaders. Those leaders will not be in favor of instituting a program for civilians that takes away from their military training capability. Therefore, the IMET-E program must be separate and in addition to a country's regular IMET program if it is to

⁴IMET-E, or expanded IMET, is a program begun in 1991 to "train foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering military establishments and budgets, and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including internationally recognized human rights." See *U.S. Code*, Public Law 101-513, Title III, "Military Assistance," 104 Stat. 1997, for legislative direction, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), *Report to the United States Congress on Development of the Expanded IMET Initiative*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 15 July 1991, for an indication of how the Department of Defense is implementing the program.

succeed. And because there are clearly other educational needs that should be addressed for internal development to succeed, the scope of IMET-E should be increased to encompass those as well.

In addition to increasing IMET-E in scope, how IMET-E is solicited in the country will also need to be improved. At present, the security assistance officer represents the IMET program to the country. If the intent of the program is to gain support for instruction to members of other agencies in a foreign government, then broader participation by the U.S. Embassy will be necessary.

Understanding Why We Train

Clearly, there are many reasons why the United States provides training to foreign militaries, and now to civilians. An evaluation of U.S. motives for training in the post-Cold War era may reveal that U.S. interests and objectives should be changed. A key difference between the objectives of the United States and those of the recipients seems to lie in whose interests the training is believed to serve. A result the United States all too often overlooks is that improving a foreign military may actually result in not having to employ U.S. combat forces at some later date. However, attempting to focus on objectives that seek to obtain leverage or influence has in the past resulted only in accusations, resentment, and fears of infringement on a nation's sovereignty.

Perhaps the most cogent objective of training is stated in *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, in which training is defined as the act of teaching "so as to make fit, qualified, or proficient."⁵ If this definition were to be adopted as the primary objective, then U.S. training to definable standards in tactics, professionalism, leadership, and technical courses would be provided to foreign militaries in order for them to be more capable against external enemies and internal subversive elements. As in the U.S. military, then, training would be provided to improve the readiness of that foreign force. Whatever benefits accrued by the host nation—or the United States, for that matter—as a result of training would be secondary. In part, much of the confusion over the program stems from the number of different and sometimes contradictory objectives for and interpretations of why the United States provides training. A simple and

⁵Merriam-Webster, Inc., *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, Springfield, Mass., 1989, p. 1251.

measurable definition of the objective, such as that provided by Webster, would enable the Departments of State and Defense to eliminate much of the previous debate and controversy over the subject of IMET and its influence on IDAD.

Acknowledgments

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The review and valuable insights provided by Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer Taw, and Kongdan Oh were also of immeasurable assistance. Of course, any opinions expressed herein are my own.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Symbol	Definition
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
CONUS	Continental United States
DA	Developmental Assistance; Department of the Army
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
DFT	Deploy-for-training
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
E-IMET	Expanded International Military Education and Training; referred to in this Note as IMET-E
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FID	Foreign internal defense
FMCS	Foreign Military Construction Sales
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sale
GNP	Gross national product
GOL	Government of Liberia
GUS	Government of the United States
HQ	Headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
IDAD	Internal defense and development
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ITAP	International Training and Assistance Program
LAP	Liberian Action Party
LUP	Liberian Unification Party
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MFDC	<i>Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance</i>

Symbol	Definition
MRM	Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRA	National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly
OASD (ISA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAI	African Independence Party
PDS	Senegalese Democratic Party
POMCUS	Prepositioned material configured in unit sets
PRC	People's Redemption Council
PS	Socialist Party (of Senegal)
SAO	Security Assistance Office [or officer]
TAFT	Technical Assistance Field Team
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UP	Unity Party
UPP	United People's Party
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
WATC	West African Training Cruise

1. Introduction

Relating Means to Ends

The development of U.S. policies, goals, and objectives has always been an extremely complex process, involving the integrated planning and coordination of all branches and departments of government. For the past 45 years, this process has had one point of focus: the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Today, that focus is gone; yet the process continues in essentially its same form to determine strategic interests and identify ways to protect those interests.

U.S. Strategic Objectives

Strategic interests and objectives are articulated in *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, which is prepared annually and presented to Congress by the president. The objectives of the United States are

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.¹

The various departments of government develop foreign policy, plans, programs, and capabilities designed to achieve the national objectives. Accordingly, Security Assistance is designed specifically to achieve those objectives. *Security Assistance* is defined in the *Department of Defense Dictionary* as:

Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles,

¹*National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991, pp. 3-4.

military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.²

It is achieved through a variety of economic and military programs, including economic support, developmental assistance, the Public Law 480 food for peace programs, counter-narcotics programs, the Peace Corps, peacekeeping, foreign military financing, and International Military Education and Training.³

The Relationship of Training to U.S. Strategy

Education and training are related to U.S. strategy because they are intended to contribute to healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. They also assist in the development and maintenance of regional stability by enhancing the capabilities of foreign militaries, which may in turn reduce the need to employ U.S. forces in combat. They also can assist in the development of democratic institutions and a general awareness of the democratic values and ideals that are important to the United States, such as freedom of speech and respect for human rights.

However, training is not an answer in and of itself. It is a component of an overall strategy for integrating a number of capabilities into a coherent and effective foreign policy toward developing nations that have legitimate needs. Training, in some cases, may provide an awareness of societal deficiencies and actually result in additional frustration and instability.

The Purpose of Training

There is some difference of opinion as to precisely what training of foreign militaries is designed to accomplish, or how it is to be accomplished. The Foreign Assistance Act stipulates what Congress believes International Military Education and Training (IMET) is designed for. IMET is to:

- Establish mutually beneficial relationships.
- Improve foreign self-reliance.
- Increase understanding of human rights.⁴

²Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Joint Publication 1-02, 1 December 1989, p. 327.

³U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, FY 92.

⁴U.S. Congress, *Congressional Declaration of Purpose (of International Military Education and Training)*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 22 U.S.C. 2347b, n.d.

The Department of Defense, charged with implementing IMET, seeks to emphasize training that improves the professionalism of foreign militaries. Toward such improvement, it offers to qualified military personnel selected by their country training in the same types of subjects offered to U.S. military personnel. The objectives of IMET, according to the *Security Assistance Management Manual*, are

- To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.
- To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems for effective management of its defense establishment.
- To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability.
- To promote military rapport and understanding leading to increased rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.⁵

Despite the objectives stated in the *Security Assistance Management Manual* or in the Foreign Assistance Act, many in the military view the value of training foreign militaries in much more pragmatic terms. Military officers believe that the primary reason the United States trains foreign military personnel is to establish military-to-military relationships that may be useful in times of crisis. In fact, it was just such relationships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Senegal, and Pakistan that facilitated the formation of the international coalition against Iraq in 1990. In addition, such training, along with the provision of equipment through Foreign Military Financing, facilitates interoperability among the forces in times of crisis, as it did in Iraq. Finally, training, although cheap in comparison with many other government programs, gives the United States a certain freedom of action in other countries, whether through overflight rights or basing agreements. In the military view, these are the ultimate goals of security assistance from which training stems. The extent to which the training improves the professionalism or democratic values of foreign military forces, while important, is in many ways secondary to the primary goal of influence.⁶

Unfortunately, by its action, Congress seems to view the primary purpose of training through the prism of human rights as it did in El Salvador and Liberia in the 1980s and in Thailand in 1992. So, when a country embracing diverse

⁵Department of Defense, *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, DoD 5105.38-M, pp. 1000-1-1000-2.

⁶Conversations with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Headquarters, U.S. European Command (HQ USEUCOM).

cultural backgrounds commits or permits human-rights abuses against its people, the U.S. military and government lose an opportunity to maintain contact and possibly influence against such abuses because training sanctions are imposed.

From the recipient's perspective, the training offered by the United States may either be valuable or simply a means to an end. It may be valuable because the country may not physically have the capability to train its own but still have the requirement. Or it may have a sincere need to improve its military but lack the funds to do so; U.S. IMET grants help. It also contributes to the knowledge and awareness of the United States and its society. But in many cases, such awareness is not a consideration to the recipient. Less grand goals, such as rewarding personnel for service or learning something new, may more than likely be the true reason for the recipient's participating.

Despite grandiose U.S. objectives for IMET, the end result must be considered in the appropriate context. IMET seeks to provide a service that is lacking to a recipient. It seeks to establish contacts within other countries' military and that of the United States. And it seeks to expose foreign personnel to the "American experience." To quote one individual who has been involved in security assistance for 15 years:

IMET is like planting seedcorn. You throw out ten kernels. Six may sprout. And of those six, four may grow through the drought. And of those four, two may bear fruit. Likewise in IMET, of ten students, six may go back to their countries with positive feelings about the United States and democracy. Of those six, four may progress in their careers, either in the military or, after getting out, in civilian service. And of those four, maybe two might be placed into a position where they can influence their society.⁷

How Training Is Accomplished

Security Assistance Programs, by law, fall under the broad responsibility of the secretary of state; the military aspects of the program, principally Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training, are administered by the secretary of defense.

Training can be accomplished in a number of ways, either in the United States or in the host country:

⁷Conversation with HQ USEUCOM representative.

- Through International Military Education and Training (IMET), and sometimes through Foreign Military Financing, military students are brought to the United States to study and participate with their U.S. counterparts in military training institutions.
- A Mobile Training Team (MTT), consisting of 8–12 U.S. military personnel and funded either by IMET funds or by their own unit, can be sent to a foreign country for up to a six-month period to train its soldiers and officers in specific skills. If longer times are required, a Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) may be sent for up to one year.
- The United States can also deploy-for-training (DFT) a U.S. unit, a portion of a unit, or a composite unit to a foreign country to train and work with the host-nation armed forces as well as for the purpose of providing some expressed capability to the citizenry (i.e., medical or engineering support).
- Joint-combined exercises can be conducted with foreign military organizations primarily to provide the combined forces the opportunity to train together and *interoperate*.

Training's Impact on Internal Defense and Development

The benefits of these forms of training vary with the student, the foreign military unit, and the conditions extant in the country. Generally, training creates a certain rapport between the two militaries. It may have a positive effect on the professionalism and awareness of the foreign student. Indeed, it could influence the student to take steps within the realm of his authority to try to change his country and emulate some of the more positive aspects of American society. Or it may have no effect.

Particularly in Africa, where change and development have not occurred despite considerable investment by many countries around the world, training in the United States may simply be a respite for a deserving individual from an otherwise dreary existence. Actual change as a result of training by any of the methods mentioned previously is problematic for many reasons. First, despite the best of intentions to place a trained individual in a place where he can influence or transfer his knowledge to his peers or subordinates, the personnel system in most African countries is simply not sophisticated enough to identify those with the training and then assign them appropriately. Second, in some African countries, knowledge represents a threat to the government and so trained students, especially military personnel, become a liability. Third, a majority of the students coming to the United States, or a majority of the personnel who receive training in-country from MTTs, are so junior in the

institution of their military and government that the training becomes insignificant. Fourth and final, the situation in his country may be so overwhelmingly desperate that, once returned to that environment, the student must concentrate on taking those measures that ensure survival.⁸ It simply may be too hard for African institutions at their present level of development to benefit in any particularly grand way from the training the United States offers.

A more fundamental issue, however, may be what effect, if any, that military training has on internal defense and development (IDAD). The *Department of Defense Dictionary* defines IDAD separately as internal defense and internal development. However, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 defines IDAD as "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."⁹ So military support to IDAD may be incidental to the full range of measures a nation is taking. Indeed, it may be erroneous to attempt to charge or blame the military for success or failure of a particular country's IDAD strategy given the unified totality of effort and commitment required by all participants.

A military force can definitely hinder development; however, whether development hinges on the civic action of a nation's military is questionable. Inasmuch as military training does contribute to the overall education, experience, and base of knowledge of an individual, the extent to which that individual becomes a contributing member of his country—either in or out of the military—and the opportunities of which he takes advantage then become his responsibility.

Recent Studies and Assessments of Training

During the past ten years, IMET and Security Assistance have been evaluated extensively by virtually every aspect of U.S. society (proponents, opponents, academics, etc.) to attempt to see what benefits accrue to the United States from training other nations' militaries and what means are available, other than anecdotal evidence, to evaluate the effectiveness of such training.

In 1989, Congress directed both the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) to prepare reports on the objective effectiveness of IMET. In particular, Congress wanted the reports to address the

⁸Ibid.

⁹Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 5 December 1990, p. GLOSSARY-5.

effectiveness of the program, the value and outcomes of the courses offered, and the program's specific accomplishments in advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.¹⁰ As one would expect, DSAA highlighted the effective, low-cost attributes of IMET—the establishment of enduring military-to-military relationships and the development of generally favorable attitudes toward the United States—whereas GAO found that there was no means in place to determine the effectiveness of the program beyond anecdotes, or even to determine how trained personnel are utilized. The GAO also addressed the issue of using IMET funds to train foreign students in nation-building, a term that is closely related to IDAD, and found:

- That training in nation-building should be considered on a country-by-country basis
- That the recipient country required appropriate resources to implement the training
- That other forms of training, such as Mobile Training Teams, might be more appropriate
- That most U.S. military personnel interviewed believed that the IMET program should be increased in order to accommodate both the professional military aspects of training and the nation-building aspects of training.

The result of all previous assessments and of this research is that, with its many different objectives and findings, training of foreign military students is many things to many people. It fosters rapport, trust, and confidence in U.S. equipment, personnel, and tactics. It gives the United States some influence on other nations' actions. It assists in the development and the defense of foreign nations. It improves the professionalism of foreign militaries, reducing somewhat the need of U.S. forces to intervene. And it exposes foreign students to American culture, values, and ideals. However, training does not necessarily cure all the ills of a country and, taken by itself, cannot foster change in a country's fundamental causes of instability without a concerted and dedicated effort by the host-nation government in a myriad of other areas as well.

¹⁰United States Senate, *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1990*, Report 101-131 of the Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.R. 2939, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 14 September 1989, pp. 161-162.

Strategic Interests in Africa

U.S. strategic interests in Africa have traditionally been designed to prevent or eliminate the spread of communism, fascism, and totalitarianism. The United States has sought to develop friends and allies in Africa to counter the spread of Soviet domination there. To accomplish this, the United States has offered economic and military aid to countries, ostensibly to promote democracy and create stability, but in fact to establish an environment wherein the United States was permitted a certain freedom of action and the Soviet Union (or Cuba) was not. The stated 1980s' goal of Security Assistance in Africa was to use it "as a tool to project and protect U.S. interests and to counter the threat of communist expansion."¹¹

The following two case studies of the republics of Liberia (Section 2) and Senegal (Section 3) reveal the dichotomy of two different governments: the level of their dedication to democratic development, the effect of ethnicity on success or failure, the ability of the government to work with or against its military, and the usefulness (or lack thereof) of U.S. policy and training strategies. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Section 4.

¹¹U.S. Congress, *Accomplishments of Security Assistance, 81-85*, Presentation on Security Assistance, FY87. This assertion has been refuted by senior members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense charged with development and implementation of Security Assistance and training policies in Africa.

2. The Republic of Liberia

History and Background

Although considered by many to be anglophonic or an American colony as a result of the migration of freed U.S. slaves in the nineteenth century, Liberia is in fact a diverse composite of several ethnic, religious, and national groups. Many of the 14 tribes extant in Liberia today migrated there sometime between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries.

Until 1980, political authority within the country was strongly centralized by continuous leadership under the True Whig Party, a group of predominantly Americo-Liberians.¹ In April 1980, as a result of a decade-long economic and social decline attributed by many to a lack of imagination and leadership on the part of the country's government,² a U.S.-trained army master sergeant named Samuel K. Doe seized power in a bloody coup that resulted in the murder of over 200 people, including the previous president, William Tolbert, 24 of his personal staff the night of the coup, and 13 cabinet ministers a few days later. In addition, over 500 political opponents were taken prisoner.³

The Regime of Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe

Doe's ten-year reign was brutal and corrupt, and characterized by constant change. Doe placed people whom he trusted in various governmental positions, resulting in a gradual transition of the seat of power in Liberia from Americo-Liberian to members of the Krahn, Doe's ancestral tribe. During his tenure, Doe was challenged almost annually by coup attempts as members of his own cabinet and others attempted to remove him from power. Until the end, each attempt was met with brutal repression.

¹With the help of the U.S. Congress in 1838, freed slaves united and formed the Commonwealth of Liberia. In 1847, Liberia became Africa's first independent nation.

²Banks, A. S., et al., *Political Handbook of the World*, 1990, State University of New York at Binghamton: CSA Publications, 1990, p. 376.

³"Whence Liberia?" *Africa Index*, April 1980, pp. 21-22. Doe and his unit had been trained by a Special Forces Mobile Training Team for six months just prior to the coup.

During Doe's first five years, the nation was under a state of martial law: People who opposed him were arrested, political parties were banned, and elections were suspended. Beginning in 1984, Doe permitted the formation of opposition political parties (although they were nonetheless harassed and repressed). In October 1985 the first national elections since the coup were held.⁴ Widespread allegations of election fraud and ballot tampering were reported and resulted in another attempted coup in November 1985. The leader of the coup, Brigadier General Quiwonkpa, an IMET-trained military officer and co-leader of the 1980 coup that put Doe in power, was killed in the attempt.⁵ Many of his supporters were either killed or imprisoned, with Doe-orchestrated reprisals claiming an additional 5,000 lives.⁶ The majority of the deaths were civilians from the Gio and Mano tribes, whom Doe apparently sought to punish for their alleged support of the coup.

Beyond the fraud and oppression that characterized the Doe government, corruption, mismanagement, and general administrative ineptitude were commonplace. Most of Doe's cabinet were corrupt and erroneously, in the words of one observer, saw such corruption as "the only way in which they could become rich enough to live the kinds of lifestyles which the public expected of politicians."⁷ Thus, by the end of the decade, corruption and mismanagement, combined with rapid population growth and the flight of foreign business from oppression, resulted in a drop in national wealth by 16 percent while personal income declined by 33 percent.⁸

The Civil War (1989-?)

In December 1989, a small group of insurgents led by former Doe cabinet member Charles Taylor began a popular uprising against the government.⁹ Doe and his administration's long tradition of ineptness was demonstrated throughout its handling of the uprising. When the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) could possibly have controlled the situation, they were not deployed, despite U.S. advice to do so. When they were finally sent to suppress the

⁴The *Europa World Yearbook*, Vol. II, 1991, p. 1674.

⁵BG Quiwonkpa was highly respected by the people of Liberia for taking a stand against the corruption and mismanagement in the early 1980s that had infected the Doe Administration. That action ultimately led to his exile in 1983 to avoid persecution by Doe.

⁶Sivard, Ruth L., *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 14th ed., Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Pubs., 1991, p. 25.

⁷Huband, Mark, "The Scars of War," *Africa Report*, March-April 1991, p. 50.

⁸See *The Europa World Yearbook*, Vol. II, 1991, p. 1676, for a look at the demise of the Liberian economy in the 1980s.

⁹The insurgents belonged to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

rebellion, the army was deployed piecemeal and controlled from Monrovia. Tense ethnic rivalries, forged by years of abuse by the Doe regime, turned the populace to the rebels when Doe's forces massacred 600 Gio and Mano refugees (including women and children) who had sought asylum in a Lutheran church in Monrovia.¹⁰ This turn was not, however, due to any belief that the rebels were better at governance, but to a profound desire to rid the country of a despot.¹¹

Unfortunately, the war continues as Charles Taylor adopts and emulates the same corruption, greed, and intransigence that characterized the despot he sought to overthrow. A peacekeeping force deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) now controls Monrovia and has been able to negotiate a fragile peace agreement with what is left of the Armed Forces of Liberia and a rival faction of Taylor's NPFL—the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)—led by Yormie Johnson. The peace plan calls for each of the factions to lay down its weapons and report to garrisons under the supervision of the peacekeeping force. Unfortunately, although Taylor has reportedly agreed to these conditions, his followers, now estimated at 10,000, have neither surrendered their weapons nor ceded control of any territory. Meanwhile, almost 30,000 Liberians have died—the vast majority civilian—and almost half of the population has been uprooted in what is now regarded as one of the bloodiest wars in African history.¹²

U.S. Relationship and Strategic Interests

The United States' Historical Relationship with Liberia

The United States has had a long and varied relationship with the Republic of Liberia. Stated U.S. policy toward Liberia has principally been designed to maintain and strengthen ties between the two countries, based partly on the fact that some of the population, albeit an extremely small portion, is of U.S. descent.

The United States took the lead in the nineteenth century in negotiating with tribal chiefs to provide land and protection to freed slaves. In 1926, the U.S.-owned Firestone Corporation introduced commerce to Liberia through the cultivation, harvest, and export of rubber—a crop that has been a principal

¹⁰"Liberia After Doe: The Bloody Struggle for Power," *Africa Report*, September–October 1990, p. 5.

¹¹Banks et al., 1990, p. 378.

¹²Noble, K. B., "Liberian Rebel Leader Rules Empire of His Own Design," *The New York Times International*, April 14, 1992; "Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 5; Kieh, G. K., "Combatants, Patrons, Peacemakers, and the Liberian Civil Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 138.

export since its discovery there and a critical resource during World War II, when Japan controlled much of the world's rubber supplies. Also during World War II, Liberia became a major stopover for U.S. soldiers entering the African theater of operations. In support of this stopover, U.S. Army engineers built roads throughout the interior of Liberia and began construction of a deep-water port in Monrovia.¹³ From the end of World War II until 1980, when Doe seized power, U.S. and Liberian relations were generally cordial and mutually self-supportive as Liberia appeared to prosper and the United States' basic interest in Africa—stopping communist expansion—was achieved.

The U.S. Response to Samuel K. Doe

Throughout Doe's reign, the United States overlooked the continuous excesses that gave him a reputation in Africa rivaling even that of former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.¹⁴ U.S. policy in Liberia could best be described as inconsistent—absent any standards by which the Doe government was expected to abide.

Along with a majority of the world, the U.S. Congress condemned Doe when he seized power. However, in September 1980, after Doe began to show interest in closer ties with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya, the United States sent the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. Moose to Liberia to investigate the situation and report to Congress on possible U.S. courses of action. Upon the completion of his fact-finding mission, Mr. Moose recommended four objectives the United States should pursue to "ensure the success of the new Doe government":

- Assist the new government in stabilizing its economy by assisting in the development of a budget, adjusting the IMF [International Monetary Fund] deficit, and providing rice under P.L. [Public Law] 480.
- Encourage the People's Redemption Council (PRC) to return to civilian rule and release all political prisoners.
- Support military training, provide new equipment to the military, and build enlisted housing.
- Support long-term development of the country.¹⁵

¹³Thomson, J. H., *The Liberian Coup d'Etat: Its Impact on Economic and Security Assistance*, Defense Technical Information Center, 30 March 1988.

¹⁴"Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 6.

¹⁵"U.S. Attitudes to New Liberia," *West Africa*, 8 September 1980, pp. 1703–1704.

A reversal in congressional attitude toward the Doe government occurred almost immediately and is best represented by its instant infusion of money into Liberia—\$10.7 million in economic aid and \$5.5 million in military aid—during fiscal year 1980. In addition, three U.S. Army Mobile Training Teams were sent to Liberia that year to train the newly formed 1st Infantry Battalion, the Army Staff, and the Ranger Company.¹⁶

Aid to Liberia during the 1980s exceeded that given to any other sub-Saharan country. As stated in Department of State *Congressional Presentations for Security Assistance Programs* throughout the 1980s, U.S. aid to Liberia was designed to:

- Enhance cooperative defense and security,
- Preserve the longstanding close relationship between the two countries,
- Promote democratic institutions and respect for human rights,
- Enhance the Liberian Army's nation-building role,
- Support economic stability and infrastructure development.¹⁷

However, despite the articulation of these broad policies, U.S. interests and actions in Liberia focused on the creation of and access to certain facilities and capabilities deemed essential to maintain U.S. freedom of action in Africa. They included an Omega communications and navigation relay station near Monrovia and the largest Voice of America transmitter in the world. The United States also obtained military landing and refueling rights at Roberts International Airfield outside Monrovia, a U.S.-built airport, and a port call in Monrovia for U.S. ships. In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Liberia had the largest contingent of personnel in Africa, numbering nearly 500, primarily there to collect intelligence on the region.

U.S. Attempts to Promote Democracy in Doe's Regime

The U.S. government attempted in a number of ways to ensure that the Doe regime quickly transitioned into a civilian democracy. During the first five years, they assisted the government in the development of a national constitution that closely resembled the United States' constitution. And they continuously pressured Liberia to release political prisoners and hold free elections.

¹⁶Thomson, 1988, pp. 47-48.

¹⁷U.S. Department of State, Vol. II, 1987, p. 80.

In October 1985, after the first elections since Doe seized power, the Reagan Administration, ignoring both widespread reports of election fraud and the carnage that followed the election, praised the "newly-elected" Doe Administration as "a civilian government based on elections . . . a journalistic community of government and non-governmental newspapers and radio stations, an ongoing tradition among the citizenry of speaking out, and a new constitution which protects those freedoms."¹⁸ The administration's position is curious, given the fact that the U.S. Congress, anticipating election fraud in August 1985, admonished Doe to conduct a "free and fair election in a climate where critics may express their views without fear of arrest or retribution."¹⁹ And afterward, the U.S. Congress quickly joined the world in condemning the elections and passed a nonbinding resolution on the administration to withhold U.S. economic and military aid from Liberia until it could be verified that the Doe government was moving toward democracy.²⁰

In 1987, in response to a U.S. General Accounting Office study concluding that as much as \$50 million of U.S. aid had been diverted or misused,²¹ and in hopes of increasing the Doe Administration's credibility, the United States sent a team of financial experts to Liberia to assist in developing viable financial institutions and better accountability. The team, however, was unable to improve Liberia's fiscal situation and departed after only a few months, concluding that the majority of government officials were more interested in short-term political survival and deal-making than in long-term recovery or nation-building efforts. In other words, the government was basically interested more in personal gain than in national governance.

U.S. Response to the Civil War

The Bush Administration appeared to have been unable to embrace a clear and focused policy toward the evolving situation in Liberia since the civil war began in 1989. Although the administration initially supported Doe, it eventually abandoned him and adopted a totally neutral position on the civil war,

¹⁸"Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 6. Words from then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Cocker.

¹⁹U.S. Congress, *Prospects for Democracy in Liberia*, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, September 18, 1985, p. 5.

²⁰U.S. Congress, *A Sense of the House Resolution on Liberia*, House Resolution 367, February 24, 1986.

²¹General Accounting Office, *Liberia: Problems in Accountability and Control over U.S. Assistance*, Washington D.C.: GAO Report NSIAD-87-86BR, February 1987; Banks et al., 1990, p. 378.

supporting neither Taylor²² nor Johnson but maintaining open lines of communication with each. When, in September 1990, an "all-Liberian conference" selected an interim government to fill the vacuum left by the death of Samuel Doe, the U.S. government voiced support for the interim government and maintained liaison with it, but never formally recognized the government.²³ In addition, the tentativeness with which the administration has addressed the Liberian refugee situation has prompted some to accuse the United States government of racism.²⁴

In September 1990, while waiting for what he perceived would be intervention by U.S. forces on his behalf, Doe was captured, tortured, and killed by Johnson. The U.S. government did consider intervening; unfortunately for Doe, Washington had concluded that he was a liability, his administration was inept, and he had lost the support of his people through his flagrant abuse of their basic human rights.²⁵ In addition, the United States at that time was totally committed to military developments in Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Shield.

The United States has now elected to work "behind the scenes" to support the ECOWAS peace initiative. Visits to the region by the assistant secretary of state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the vice president have all been designed to show support for ECOWAS, as well as to determine areas where the United States can assist. Financial aid has been provided: \$230 million in humanitarian aid and close to \$26 million to support the peacekeeping force.²⁶ U.S. military units and Mobile Training Teams have been deployed to neighboring countries in the region to train indigenous forces in an attempt to strengthen the militaries and dissuade spread of the Liberian war. And, to encourage their involvement in maintaining peace in the region and to assist in

²²The United States has had difficulty supporting the current president's (Dr. Amos Sawyer) election and has indicated that any new government of Liberia would not be legitimate until Taylor was made a part of it. Huband, M., "The Power Vacuum," *Africa Report*, January-February 1991, p. 28. While the basis for this position is not clear, it is clear that as an insurgent, Charles Taylor has neither been elected nor has any legitimate right to govern. In addition, Taylor has planned and approved many of the atrocities the NPFL committed against both the AFL and the people of Liberia. Finally, Charles Taylor is a wanted criminal in the United States, having escaped from a Boston jail in 1985 while awaiting extradition to Liberia for embezzling almost \$1 million. Noble, 1992, p. A3; "Liberia After Doe," 1990, pp. 5-6; Banks et al., 1990, p. 377. Before the embargo imposed in October 1992, he was shipping timber, iron ore, diamonds, and rubber out of Liberia and depositing the proceeds into a private Swiss account. "Update, Liberia," *Africa Report*, July-August 1991, p. 7.

²³Novicki, M., "Dr. Amos Sawyer: Keeping the Peace," *Africa Report*, November-December 1991; "Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 6; Kieh, 1992, p. 134. George Kieh implies that the reason the United States has not yet fully committed itself to support Dr. Sawyer is the possibility that he would not be as amenable to U.S. considerations as other possible candidates.

²⁴"Safe Haven for Liberians in the U.S.," *Africa Report*, January-February 1991, p. 11; "Exiled Liberians in the U.S. Granted a Reprieve," *Africa Report*, March-April 1991, p. 11.

²⁵"Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 5.

²⁶Da Costa, P., "Good Neighbors," *Africa Report*, November-December 1991, p. 23; U.S. State Department Press Release, 16 June 1992.

economic recovery, the United States has forgiven over \$47 million in debt owed by Senegal.²⁷ These actions seem to be designed to give Africa the opportunity to develop a solution to what the administration considers to be an African problem.

The United States has lost a considerable amount of influence in Liberia and Africa: first, through its association with the Doe regime and then by its vacillation during the civil war. The few survivors of the AFL believe the United States deserted them at a crucial moment; Liberians in general denounce the Bush Administration for failing to act to stop the carnage while U.S. Marines were stationed off the coast of Monrovia, evacuating American citizens.²⁸ Indeed, many of the Marines themselves had some difficulty understanding why they were not used to provide humanitarian assistance to the vast numbers of Liberians who were without basic services.²⁹ However, because Liberia is purportedly a "U.S. possession," the international community was waiting for the United States to act. The questions become, What might the United States have done differently and what should be done now?

Internal Defense Threats and Internal Development Problems

Internal and External Defense Threats

Other than coup attempts, which occurred with regularity during the 1980s, there were no threats, either internal or external, for which the Liberian armed forces had to be ready to defend the government or the country. Doe generally distrusted his neighbors, primarily Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, because he knew they did not approve of the coup that brought him to power. He also was afraid that Libya was conspiring to depose him. However, most of his suspicions were unfounded.

Internal Development Requirements in the 1980s

Prior to Doe, the Liberian government had begun to increase the number of indigenous trained technical, professional, and managerial personnel. As a result of the worldwide recession of the 1970s, combined with corruption endemic in

²⁷Kieh, 1992, p. 139; "Update, Liberia," 1991, p. 12. Similar actions are being taken with Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda in support of their economic reform programs.

²⁸Da Costa, "Good Neighbors," 1991, p. 23.

²⁹Discussions with U.S. Marines guarding the Embassy compound.

Liberia's government of that time and out-of-control population growth, national wealth fell by 10 percent from 1974 to 1980 at the same time that individual yearly income dropped by 27 percent, from \$1,040 to \$759. Development of the country was hampered by poor management and planning, combined with a lack of national funds for infrastructure investment. Doe's coup exacerbated the situation when he killed most of the even marginally qualified cabinet members and replaced them with even less trained personnel.

The economy remained a predominant cause of the instability in Liberia during Doe's reign. Based primarily on the export of iron ore, rubber, and timber, the national economy declined an average of 1.3 percent per year in the 1980s at a time when the population was growing by an average of 3.1 percent per year (see Figure 2.1).³⁰ Unemployment rose from 50 percent in 1980 when Doe took power to 58 percent in 1988, while the consumer price index rose by over 100 percent. Income distribution remained skewed, with 68 percent of the nation's wealth being in the hands of only 5 percent of the people.³¹ Agriculture ceased as people began to seek refuge in neighboring countries; as other businesses fled simply to survive, the entire economic structure of the country crumbled. Finally, in 1987, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) censured Liberia for failure to meet its debts at the same time that the U.S. Congress imposed the Brooke-Alexander Amendment, cutting off further aid, for Liberia's default on its U.S. aid repayment schedule and its failure to implement acceptable political reforms.

Besides the deaths from atrocities, health care and health delivery systems were severely inadequate. Of course, with a lack of adequate health care systems, during the peak of the civil war many who could have been helped simply died as the medical institution also crumbled.³² While population grew, and families were faced with the reality of not being able to sustain themselves, the infant mortality rate grew by 145 percent.


The Armed Forces of Liberia

Doe inherited a military of approximately 5,000 strong, consisting mostly of army personnel and a small coast guard. The army's mission focused generally on

³⁰*The Europa World Yearbook*, Vol. II, 1991, p. 1676.

³¹Kieh, 1992, pp. 128-129.

³²Even if they had had the desire to assist in this area, the Liberian military could not. They were not even structured with enough medical assets to care for themselves, and the few medics available were untrained.



SOURCE: Compiled from *The Europa World Yearbook*, 1980–1987

Figure 2.1—Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP) and Income Growth in Liberia

defense of the nation from external aggression, maintenance of internal security, and conduct of anti-smuggling operations. The army consisted of five infantry battalions, an elite Executive Mansion Guard, one artillery battalion, one engineer battalion, and one aviation reconnaissance company. After both the coup and a series of purges designed to rid the Armed Forces of Liberia of any threats to his power, Doe increased the size of the military to about 7,000 men, which by 1983 included one additional infantry battalion, a brigade support unit, a military police unit, and a logistics command. He also added the maintenance of law and order to its mission. From 1980 to 1983, the military's budget increased from \$16.5 million to \$27.2 million. In addition, in 1983 the size of the engineer battalion doubled, ostensibly to enable it to fulfill a new mission defined by Doe: to involve itself in civic action. However, given the poor state of its training, there is no indication that the AFL was very involved, or, for that matter, capable of being involved, in civic action during the Doe years.

As Doe's military became involved in the politics of the country, they were subjected to the same corrupting influences that had overtaken the rest of the government by 1983. Most senior leaders, lieutenant colonel and above, were corrupt and this corruption was resented by lower ranking personnel. It also

affected them directly: Officers sold food and clothing meant for their soldiers and deposited the proceeds in personal bank accounts, and repair parts provided by the United States were either stolen by the officers and used on their personal vehicles or sold. As corruption increased and the economy declined, even less money was made available for the armed forces. A combination of inadequate funds and poor leadership skills led to the cessation of individual and unit training. Unit skills quickly deteriorated. Moreover, a destructive cycle ensued whereby the less trained the soldiers and units became, the less confidence the soldiers had in their leaders.

The strongest indication that discipline and morale had eroded was the indiscriminate and abusive treatment meted out to the population. As soldiers took from the people they were supposed to defend, they lost the public respect they had enjoyed for years. By the end of Doe's reign, the human-rights abuses against the Liberian people had become completely out of control.

Ironically, the AFL failed to suppress the coup of 1990 for the same reasons the military failed to suppress the coup of 1980—poor and corrupt leaders and poorly trained soldiers and units. It also had little training in counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the AFL command and control and logistics systems were inadequate and ineffective, resulting in the AFL's inability to put down the enemy that challenged Doe's power.

Host-Nation Training Goals and Requirements

Doe never clearly articulated his training goals—either for the military or for his government. However, what is clear is that Doe had an abiding distrust of competence. What few institutions for governance Liberia had were destroyed when Doe seized power. Major ministerial positions were then filled with loyal members of the coup, most of whom lacked the education or experience to fulfill the requirements of their new positions. This single deficiency became much more apparent as years passed.

Doe's negative attitude toward an educated citizenry was borne out in his suppression of educational institutions. Likewise, although he supported military training programs for the opportunity and leverage they gave him with the United States, he was leery of the results. Just as Doe was afraid of education because of the inherent threat an informed citizenry posed to his reign, so too was he afraid of an effective and competent military. His answer to education was to continuously repress and harass students and teachers; for the military, he created organizational dysfunction by ensuring that collective training was kept to a minimum and leaders remained incompetent. In his view, once competence

was achieved, the military leaders (or students) would be a threat to his power.³³ A trained military, more than anything else, posed the most serious threat to him.

Beyond Doe's basic distrust of education, however, was Doe and his senior commanders' overriding belief that the United States would support the regime and intervene against any enemy.³⁴ As long as Doe was confident that the United States would protect him and as long as he could prevent a competent (i.e., threatening) military from emerging, Doe could concentrate on his first priority—retaining power.

The U.S. Training Response

Because Liberia's training goals were not stated, the U.S. Embassy took the steps necessary to develop what it considered to be an appropriate training strategy in view of its knowledge of the deficiencies in the AFL.³⁵ Training provided to Liberia was based on the annual planning process conducted by the security assistance officer in the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, in consultation with the Liberian Ministry of Defense.³⁶

U.S. Training Goals

The goal of U.S. Security Assistance Programs in Liberia in the 1980s was to develop the AFL into a well-disciplined and professionally competent force capable of defending the sovereignty of the government of Liberia and carrying out the orders of the commander-in-chief.³⁷ Therefore, the U.S. training plan for Liberia was designed to improve military leadership, individual and unit training, and equipment maintenance.

Actual U.S. Training

Annual assessments of Liberia's military enabled the Security Assistance Office (SAO) to predict the types of training required in the United States and the types

³³Wonkeryor, Edward L., *Liberia Military Dictatorship: A Fiasco 'Revolution,' Strugglers'* Community Press, 1985, p. xii.

³⁴This belief may be due to a unique bilateral treaty between the United States and Liberia, the 1951 Defense Cooperation Agreement, which states that "in the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, GUS [government of the United States] and GOL [government of Liberia] will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia."

³⁵Conversations with HQ USEUCOM representatives.

³⁶Perhaps, in retrospect, the Embassy should have reconsidered the expenditure of any funds on training, given Doe's predisposition to eliminate educational threats.

³⁷Security Assistance Training Plan for Liberia.

of MTTs required to assist in Liberia. Because the IMET program is a worldwide, relatively small training program that Congress manages closely, the number of Liberian students actually trained in the United States was very small. Indeed, over the 1980s, 318 Liberian students attending courses in the United States represented roughly 6 percent of the African military students. During the same period, over 20 U.S. Army Mobile Training Teams deployed to Liberia in an attempt to improve the AFL's training status.

Training in the United States. Liberia's training program was principally designed to provide professional military education (PME) to those leaders identified as having career potential, thereby improving the overall professionalism of the force. Each of the courses in the United States provided Liberian students the opportunity to meet and interact with their U.S. counterparts while being exposed to the American experience and democracy through the Informational Program.³⁸

Classes in U.S. military training institutions are intensive courses of study designed to stress and enhance the student's leadership and management skills as well as his knowledge base in a particular subject (infantry tactics, engineering, strategy, etc.). While these courses are generally designed to enhance the military principles deemed necessary for combat, many of the same principles are applicable to the civilian sector. Therefore, when students return to their own countries, they have learned something that should help their military to become more capable and themselves to become more marketable after they retire or are discharged. For example, officers trained in the engineer officer basic and advanced courses receive considerable training in leadership, administration, training, and combat engineering skills (obstacle emplacement and removal, river crossing, survivability operations, etc.). However, they also receive extensive training in horizontal and vertical construction and attendant project management skills. Likewise, each of the different courses offered to or requested by Liberia had an immediate military and an ultimate civilian application.

MTTs and DFTs Deployed to Liberia. Whereas IMET in the United States focuses on training the individual, Mobile Training Teams and units that are deployed for training or exercises overseas focus on training the unit or individuals within a unit who would not otherwise receive such instruction. Most of Liberia's MTT requirements stemmed from deficiencies noted in

³⁸The Informational Program is a congressional and DoD-mandated program designed to expose foreign students to U.S. ideals and values. It is not an indoctrination program and would not be received as positively if it were.

maintenance and supply. MTTs were also deployed to assist in medical training and assistance, as well as in more traditional developmental roles, such as construction; specifically to assist in the development of the skill within the unit as well as within the Liberian training institution; and to train Liberian infantry and ranger units in tactical employment. U.S. members of MTTs were expected to display outstanding character and to provide quality training. In this way, Liberian military units would be exposed to the democratic ideals and values that form the basis of the American soldier while simultaneously acquiring the tactical and technical skills required to improve unit readiness.

Training or Security Assistance Accomplishments

It is difficult to ascertain specifically what was erroneous in U.S. policies toward Liberia that resulted in so gross a failure. Yet clearly none of the stated policies or goals succeeded. The foundation for supporting Doe came from the basic recommendations of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Richard M. Moose, and was further articulated in various Security Assistance documents. Yet the United States was unsuccessful in helping Liberia either to stabilize its economy or to encourage the government to return to civilian rule. And, although the United States expended considerable resources during Doe's ten-year reign, long-term development was not achieved there. Despite U.S. attempts and over \$200 million in military aid, the United States was not able to influence the AFL's actions; nor was the AFL receptive to advice when the insurgency began.

Nothing of importance can be said of improvements in the overall readiness, training, professionalism, desire, or quality of the armed forces. According to one observer, it was impossible to gauge any ability in the leadership or the soldiers because, when the fighting began, the leaders ran to save their lives and many of the soldiers either deserted to the other side or were killed in a vain attempt to protect Doe.³⁹

As Table 2.1 illustrates, other than providing a specific resource, such as equipment or facilities, none of the objectives articulated for Liberia during the 1980s was achieved. The military was a dismal failure in responding to a small insurgency. Human-rights abuses by the government destroyed its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. And poor leadership and fear of training resulted in an undisciplined and incompetent force.

³⁹Discussion with U.S. Marine on Operation SHARP EDGE.

Table 2.1
Liberian Achievements Scorecard

Policy or Goal	Success	Policy or Goal	Success
Was the economy stabilized?	No	Was respect for human rights improved?	No
Did the government return to civilian rule?	No	Was military equipment provided?	Yes
Were democratic institutions established?	No	Were new enlisted barracks built?	Yes
Was long-term development achieved?	No	Did the AFL contribute to civic action or nation-building?	No
Was the long-standing close relationship preserved?	No	Was the AFL well-disciplined and professionally competent?	No
Were cooperative defense and security established?	No	Did the AFL defend the sovereignty of Liberia?	No
Did training improve the AFL?	No		

U.S. Influence

Through its aid to the Doe government, the United States did influence certain actions deemed in its best interests (although unstated). Doe closed the Libyan Embassy and suspended diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in return for increased aid from the Reagan Administration. The United States retained access to its facilities as well as liberal overflight, landing, and port-call rights.

However, these accomplishments cost the United States over \$600 million from 1980 to 1989,⁴⁰ making Liberia the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, by threatening to cut off aid in 1986, the United States was able to affect Doe's tolerance of human-rights abuses—but only temporarily and ineffectually.

Effect on Internal Development

During the Doe years, the military was used very little to assist in internal development partially because of its inability to do so and because of Doe's restrictions on its use. As a result, while most of the training provided both in Liberia and in America had applicability to internal development, no benefit accrued to Liberia. For instance, instruction provided in engineering and medicine applied directly to some of the internal development requirements of Liberia during the 1980s. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at

⁴⁰Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, as of September 30, 1990; GAO, 1987; U.S. Department of State, FY 1990

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, provides a general education to mid-level career officers on a wide variety of military and strategic subjects and could have contributed to the country's knowledge in national management and administration (see Table 2.2). The more technical courses (physical security, maintenance, public affairs) should have improved somewhat the technical capabilities of the country. Several reasons can be given for why benefits did not accrue.

First, the number of people in the military who were trained, even though it was more than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, was so small as to have no effect on the overall development of the country, the capability of the military, or even individual units. Most of the military trained by the United States prior to 1980 were killed or went into exile upon Doe's assumption of power.⁴¹ During

Table 2.2
Training Provided to Liberian Soldiers in the United States

Course	1985	1986	1987 ^a	1988 ^a	1989
Adjutant General	4	3			2
Artillery				1	
Aviation		2			1
Chaplain	2				
Command and General Staff College	1	1			1
Engineering	10	1		1	2
Finance	2	1			
Infantry	16	15			4
Intelligence	2				
Maintenance	36	8			
Medical	10	2		1	
Ordnance	4	2			1
Physical security	1	1			1
Public affairs	1	1			1
Quartermaster	3	4		1	
Signal	2	1			1
Special Operations	3				
Transportation	1	1			1

SOURCE: Security Assistance Training Field Activity, Ft. Monroe, Va.

^aBrooke sanctions were imposed in 1987 and again in 1988 in an attempt to persuade the Liberian government to develop democratic institutions and because of Liberia's default on its aid repayments.

⁴¹There is evidence to suggest that Doe killed IMET-trained officers because he believed they would not agree with his dictatorship or his corrupt and repressive methods. When BG Quiwonkpa opposed the Doe government's corruption and lack of civilian rule—problems that Doe promised the Liberian people he would change—he was ostracized and ultimately killed during a coup attempt in 1985.

the 1980s, the United States trained 317 Liberians in the United States, or approximately 5 percent of the AFL. In addition, the MTTs and DFTs who provided training in-country focused not only on leadership and unit training but on military civic action, engineering, and medical support, as well as maintenance and supply. However, there is no evidence to suggest that those deployments or the training conducted in the United States had any effect at all on the internal development of Liberia or on the ability of the military to assist in such development. In fact, the opposite might actually be true. In 1980, enlisted housing was cited as critically deficient.⁴² Accordingly, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers designed and ultimately constructed enlisted barracks—at a cost of approximately \$43 million. However, due to their lack of expertise, Liberian civil and military engineers were not able to control the construction of the project despite the fact that it was a primary mission of the AFL. After their completion, the barracks rapidly fell into disrepair from lack of maintenance.

Second, as Doe's regime tightened its rein on Liberia, most of the programs initiated by the government were implemented for the benefit only of the Krahn tribe. Neither Doe, his government, nor the AFL had any interest in helping the country as a whole. In fact, although there were ethnic differences before Doe's rise to power, they were predominantly between the indigenous tribes and the Americo-Liberian segment. Doe won popular support for a time by extricating Liberia from the Americo-Liberian rule. However, he rapidly lost that support by treating the Krahn preferentially.⁴³

Third, in the past two years, so much has happened that has reversed any improvements possibly occurring in the country. By all indicators, during the 1980s Liberia degenerated into a crumbling mess. The last two years have only placed the coup de grâce on the nation. If internal development is to have a possibility of success in the future, any action that occurs now toward it must be a coordinated international endeavor, with the full support and commitment of a Liberian government interested in legitimacy and reform.

Impact on Internal Defense

U.S. military training did not effectively change the professionalism or capabilities of the Liberian armed forces despite continuous deployment of Mobile Training Teams to Liberia and the training of Liberian military

⁴²Recall this was one of the reasons Doe and his supporters took over in the first place.

⁴³Conversation with persons from HQ USEUCOM and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD-ISA).

students in the United States. Nor did it improve the abilities of the military to counter an insurgency. Indeed, the majority of the training focused on improving leadership and logistics. Tactics training focused on more conventional operations and less on the necessity, for instance, of taking actions that make the government appear more legitimate and desirable than the insurgency. However, the corruption and abuses committed by the AFL make it doubtful that anything would have legitimized the government or the AFL in the eyes of the Liberian citizenry. Thus, owing to the persistent abuses by the AFL, when Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia across the border into Liberia in December 1989 with only 167 lightly armed men, the insurgent force rapidly grew to a formidable size.

While most students who came to the United States seemed to be on a par with their U.S. counterparts, they were never successful in transferring either the quality of instruction or the quality of life found in the United States to their peers and subordinates in Liberia. Likewise, MTT team chiefs were struck by the necessity to "start from ground zero" every time a new team went to Liberia.

Whereas just ten years before most of the leaders were killed by Doe, and corporals were promoted to generals and were assumed to be competent to lead an army, Liberia again has no military leadership: Most of the leaders have been killed. Any solution to Liberia's military problems now will require a long-term, intensive, and closely managed effort to develop the core of a professional and competent force.

Liberia Summary

Inasmuch as the primary U.S. policies and objectives in Liberia during the 1980s, although unstated, were to stop communist expansionism and retain access to vital facilities and capabilities, its aid and training programs might well be considered successful. However, Liberia may well be a perfect example of the operation's being a success but the patient still dying.

Causes of Collapse in Liberia

What were the fundamental causes of downfall for the Doe regime and how could the United States have acted differently to prevent it? Clearly, the issues are broader than just a military dimension, or, more specifically, a military training dimension (the primary focus of this case study). Doe's approach to governance in general—his permissiveness toward corruption, his lack of experience in governmental management and administration, and his lack of

understanding of the needs of his people, combined with a blatant disregard for their basic human rights—led to his downfall.

During the 1980s, the United States provided Liberia over \$600 million in aid; of that, almost \$400 million was economic aid (e.g., Economic Support Fund [ESF], Developmental Assistance [DA], Public Law 480, Peace Corps). Of the \$200 million in military aid provided, about 5 percent was for training. However, U.S. support and training of Doe's military had no impact on the military's performance either prior to or during the civil war; nor did they provide the United States the leverage to alter Doe's performance or egregious behavior.

In addition, the total disregard for civilian casualties during the the past two years of civil war has created a situation in which none of the factions is deemed worthy of leading the nation. Even though the war is not completely over yet, what is known is that some 30,000 Liberians have been killed, thousands more have been injured, and almost 800,000 have fled the country for safety.⁴⁴ And, while the United States has not taken an active military role in ending the strife there, it has contributed \$230 million toward humanitarian assistance and forgiven almost \$400 million in foreign debts from African nations in an effort to influence the situation without getting involved.

The Costs of a Civil War—What Is Needed Now?

The threat to Liberia and the region was extensive. However, even if peace comes back to Liberia, the rape of the country and its people has all but destroyed it. Nearly half of the population has sought refuge in neighboring countries and overseas. Their return will impose a tremendous burden on an emerging government that is ill-prepared for the task before it. There is a lack of basic necessities—food, water, sanitation facilities, and medical care. The extensive corruption in the country over the past administrations and, more recently, the siphoning off to Swiss bank accounts of national revenue by Charles Taylor have left the country literally bankrupt. The treasury is empty; exports and imports have ceased; most small businesses have been looted and the businessmen have left; the Liberian dollar is worthless; and basic transport and commercial trade have disintegrated with the flight of the Mandingo people. And possibly most troubling, rice, Liberia's staple and the reason for the dissatisfaction that began Liberia's trouble over 13 years ago, has not even been produced in over two years.

⁴⁴Many of the troubles of Liberia today are now blamed on the Krahn. What is unfortunate is that the majority of the Krahn did not actually benefit from the years of abuse permitted by Doe, yet they all now bear the brunt of Liberian anger over the atrocities and abuses committed by all parties.

The children of Liberia, now mostly aligned with the NPFL, are a source of considerable difficulty. Mostly 15 to 17 years old (and younger), these children have had to live with nothing all their lives—to search for food and even shelter as the Doe regime disintegrated and proved unable to provide for the basic needs of its people. Taylor offered hope in 1989. Now, for the last two years at least, they have wanted for nothing. According to many eyewitness reports, these teenagers are now the backbone of the NPFL. They walk around the country with AK-47s, exuding confidence and bravado. If they want something, they take it. If they get resistance, they simply shoot the resister. Many of these teens are either drunk or on drugs: Their eyes are bloodshot, and they seem to be incoherent and unable to control their emotions. It will be extremely difficult to convince them to lay down their weapons and return to a life they remember and have rejected. Yet, without their cooperation, success cannot be achieved, and Liberia cannot grow without its youth.⁴⁵

Beyond this teenager problem is the issue of ethnicity, which has plagued this tribal-based society for decades. Without some form of national commitment to ensure tribal and ethnic integration and an appreciation of and respect for ethnic diversity, Liberia will cease to exist.

Even international support agencies will be sorely pressed to revive institutions that never had qualified administrators or staff officers during the Doe regime and now suffer from radical neglect. Each institution will require substantial effort and training to ensure it becomes qualified and trusted by the Liberian citizenry.

The sheer numbers of people who are afraid to leave Monrovia now is indicative of the unrest and instability still present. However, at this point the majority of the population of Liberia, by some estimates over 900,000, has come to Monrovia for the security that the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) represents. With its normal population of 400,000 already placing an excessive load on the community infrastructure, this increase only further decreases living conditions.⁴⁶

Interim President Amos Sawyer's challenges are tremendous; his prospects are bleak.

⁴⁵Conversations with the defense attaché of Senegal, the director of operations for the Armed Forces of Senegal, and the former minister of justice for the Doe regime, now working at the United Nations.

⁴⁶Kieh, 1992, p. 138.

Training and Assistance Requirements for the 1990s

Why should we care? This is a fundamental question that must be addressed. There is no longer a fear of Soviet or Cuban intervention. Likewise, there is no longer a necessity to maintain such a large CIA presence in Liberia. So the basic issue becomes, Why should we care? The appropriate answer may well be "because it's the right thing to do." For humanitarian reasons or in the interests of regional stability, it may indeed still be in the best interests of the United States to help foster a more stable and secure environment in West Africa. Without help, however, peace cannot be achieved and Liberia will continue to destabilize the region.

Assuming the United States does care and has an interest in returning to Liberia, it might be possible to forge a training strategy, in close coordination with a legitimate and committed government, that assists in the pursuit of a program of reform. Clearly, the focus of training should turn from military tactics, techniques, and procedures to the more practical courses that will give governmental ministries the ability to develop appropriate reforms to govern a people with a tremendous amount of legitimate distrust for both a government in power and the United States. This said, what might be the appropriate courses of action for training in the 1990s?

Politica. The interim and ultimate governments of Liberia may require assistance in determining precisely what political reforms are required to return the country to peace and prosperity. Such assistance can be accomplished through the deployment of U.S. interagency and international teams of experts to provide the necessary education to Dr. Sawyer's (or his legitimate successor's) cabinet and staff and to assist them in assessing reform and reconstruction requirements.⁴⁷ Indeed, a more robust exchange program, similar to that attempted under Doe in 1987, might warrant reconsideration in an attempt to assist in the development of economic and political stability, legitimacy, and a warmer relationship than that which currently exists between the two countries. Likewise, selected cabinet and staff members could be sent to the United States for training and education, particularly in the areas of corporate and governmental management and administration. Key tenets of the exchange program should include development of programs that achieve established goals and increased attention to education and experience transfer to ensure that, as rapidly as possible, Liberian ministers and their staffs become competent and capable civil servants.

⁴⁷Such deployment appears to be within the scope of the Cranston-Leahy IMET-E initiative and would be ideal, if desired, for building a government from the ground up.

Socioeconomic. Among the most important aspects of Liberia's social issues is the need to establish a program for ethnic recovery. Any serious attempt to govern or assist must be centered on Liberia's sincere efforts to more fully integrate each of the diverse aspects of its society. Resolving the ethnic hatred that now abounds in Liberia is the key to elimination of human-rights violations. No simple program of education on the evils of abuse or the rule of law will erase the last ten years of systematic tribal destruction and hatred that have run rampant. The appreciation for the diversity in Liberia's society must become embedded in every aspect of Liberia's educational system; ethnic integration must become a reality within Liberia's government. Assistance programs should be measured against legitimate long-term improvements in the area of ethnic balance, and assistance should not be provided without the government's sincere move toward this balance. Without ethnic balance, Liberia is doomed to repeat over and over again the pogroms of the last ten years. U.S. and international advisers have a key role to play, as do members of the Peace Corps and churches. Each should concentrate its efforts on stressing the positive aspects of ethnic diversity, and each must likewise ensure that human-rights violations are met instantly with a united negative response (e.g., condemnation or removal of aid).⁴⁸

Liberia for the last ten years has corrected threats to its internal security by employing its armed forces against the people, consequently eliminating the image of the military as a protector of the people; rather, the AFL has become synonymous with a threat to their survival. While there used to be a police force with specific internal security responsibilities, during the Doe years the police were incorporated into the AFL. Specific training in police procedures must be developed and provided to a core of Liberian police. It must be linked to the judicial system evolving from the destruction and should not be considered as an extension of the armed forces. With congressional relief provided on a test basis,⁴⁹ the U.S. Department of Justice could organize, either through governmental, international, or private sources, an appropriate instructional capability to develop a currently nonexistent capability in Liberia to maintain law and order using appropriate, internationally recognized methods.

⁴⁸Many who provided comments or input to this case study believed that this sort of imposition would be considered an infringement on the sovereignty of Liberia. However, if both governments agree to certain achievements upfront, then failure to make progress constitutes a lack of commitment.

⁴⁹U.S. Code, Section 660D, Public Law 93-559, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, prohibits agencies of the U.S. government from training, advising, or financing foreign police agencies, with certain exceptions.

Military. The military of the 1990s faces the same problems that the military of the 1980s faced—no leaders and poorly trained soldiers. But a more serious question to be addressed now regards the function and focus of a military in tomorrow's Liberia. Assuming that ECOWAS will provide the means for security for the near term, the more serious threat to Liberia lies in reconstruction and the ability of the country to rapidly respond to the needs of its people by improving their fundamental living conditions. This is not to imply that Liberia's security needs do not require a combat capability. However, any such capability should be small and well trained. Use of a system of reserves may well be the best approach for expanding its combat capability during times of hostilities.

While there has been much debate recently on the utility of military forces in "nation-building," and there is considerable evidence to prove that the AFL of the past has not done well in this area, Liberia's needs are so great that it must apply even its military resources toward reconstruction of the country. In the area of infrastructure, Liberia's civil war has literally destroyed everything of significance. Likewise, its medical and transportation capabilities have been critically depleted. For the next several years the military's best application could well be to provide an interim capability in the areas of health, transportation, and engineering until civilian capabilities are established.

The problem is that the army has been left with no leaders and poorly trained soldiers whose ability to do these types of projects well is limited unless a revised training approach involving an investment of resources and talent is developed. If a U.S. goal is to foster stability—not only in Liberia, but regionally—then the United States will have to take the lead in developing a professional military in Liberia capable of assisting in that effort. Because there are no leaders, they will have to be developed. Because the soldiers are poorly trained in subjects such as medicine and engineering, they will have to be taught. The extent of the training requirements may require extraordinary measures on the part of the United States.

History has shown that U.S. aid and training had little effect on the abilities or performance of the AFL, in part because of the relative inexperience of the senior officers of the AFL, many of whom were promoted to generalship after the 1980 coup. As the Liberian armed forces rebuild in the 1990s, they are again faced with the prospect of no leadership. To remedy this lack, the United States may consider offering to assign U.S. military officers to key advisory positions within the Liberian armed forces for a transitional period of up to ten years. Likewise, certain Liberian military officers could be assigned to U.S. units following training in the United States, for on-the-job training, followed by application of

their new skills in specific positions in their own army. There are some immediate and long-term advantages to this approach.

First, without experienced leaders, the AFL will just return to its previous corrupt and ineffective stature. U.S. military officers in appropriate advisory positions could mold effective leaders and also could show Liberian officers how to lead by example. This could have a tremendous impact, giving the Liberian military a greater sense of respect for the basic human and civil rights of its citizens.

Second, U.S. leaders in key advisory positions in construction and medical units would enable the AFL to rapidly begin rebuilding the country. U.S. leaders could train the Liberians not only in leadership but in the more technical skills required for civic action, providing a certain aspect of quality control in those civic action projects, both during the project and afterward.

Finally, U.S. leaders can instill the staff skills required to manage a military organization, including the participation in planning, programming, and budgeting, and the military's role in a functioning democracy. U.S. leaders could also ensure that Liberians trained in the United States were placed in the most effective positions upon their return to ensure that their new skills are transferred to the maximum extent possible.

In terms of composition, Liberia's active-component armed forces should remain small and focus on those skills necessary to assist the newly forming government in rebuilding the country. Accordingly, a large engineering and medical capability, transportation units, and other logistics capabilities that will improve Liberia's living conditions should be the emphasis for the short term.⁵⁰ Two light infantry battalions should be sufficient to provide for external security in the short term. In the long term, Liberia may want to consider developing an ability to expand when required through the use of an effective reserve capability. Finally, a critical point should be that internal security, along with maintenance of law and order, should be the responsibility of a police force separate from the military.

Is This a Workable Solution?

Will this approach work? Not in and of itself. Without total commitment to reform by the Liberian government and a sincere desire to bring peace, stability,

⁵⁰The Liberian government should simultaneously concentrate on developing additional capabilities such as these in the civilian sector.

and prosperity to the country, fulfillment of the above-mentioned requirements will not solve Liberia's multitude of problems. Even with that commitment, the approach may not succeed. But approaching Liberia with a status-quo solution, one that has failed in the past, is not the answer. If the United States is indeed interested in helping Liberia to evolve into a more stable society, it must be able to assist in a way that is more involved than in the past. Such assistance should not be considered interventionism, but rather a combined attempt by two countries to move forward. As Liberia's institutions evolve to a position of independence and self-sufficiency, the United States would then be able to remove itself from the affairs of this currently beleaguered country.

3. The Republic of Senegal

History and Background

The oldest and strongest French colony in its time, Senegal sits on the westernmost point of Africa and has, since France's intervention there in the seventeenth century, enjoyed a unique position in French history. Today, Senegal's largely democratic and progressive society is a stabilizing force in West Africa, a factor that can be attributed somewhat to the years of French influence and the attendant education provided to, and experience gained by, the Senegalese bourgeoisie. While France's involvement there in many ways typified its colonial practices throughout Africa, Senegal enjoyed a special relationship apart from its neighbors, partly because it was the first to be colonized and partly because of its strategic importance to France's interests in Africa.¹

Senegal Under the French

The period of French rule in Senegal, which became a French colony in 1920,² resulted in many social and economic improvements not previously available. French foreign policy was designed to assimilate the people of its colonies into French society and culture.³ Accordingly, many citizens who would not otherwise have had the opportunity were sent to schools in France and education became mandatory for all school-aged children. Economically, France attempted to make Senegal self-sufficient by increasing production of export crops. Politically, many of the upper-class Senegalese were given the opportunity of French citizenship and the right to vote. Also, France removed much of the authority previously enjoyed by tribal chiefs and appointed district managers, normally under the supervision of a French civil servant or military officer. Senegal, above all other of France's African possessions, prospered and showed marked signs of socioeconomic improvement.

¹France's territories in Africa, called French West Africa, consisted of eight countries—Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Guinea—and its governance lasted from around 1895 to 1958.

²Banks et al., 1990, p. 555.

³Nelson, Harold D., *Area Handbook for Senegal*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 17.

Senegal, however, was not content to be a possession of France, despite the benefits accruing to it as the seat of French rule in Africa. Even though the official French policy was to assimilate Africans into French society, there was considerable discrimination by the French in the execution of this policy. Africans did not have equal rights with the French, a situation that became a major political issue over the governing of the territories in the early 1900s. After World War II, partly at the urging of the emerging European alliance and the tremendous contributions of African units during the war, France reexamined its foreign policies and colonial practices. On the basis of the right of self-determination, it began to develop far-reaching political, social, and economic reforms that ultimately led to the dissolution of French West Africa as a French territory.⁴

In 1956, along with the rest of French West Africa, Senegal was given broad control over its internal political affairs, including the right to vote for all its citizens. Consequently, while still considered a French territory, Senegal controlled internal governmental decisions and France lost almost all political significance.⁵ In 1958, Senegal became a self-governing member of the French Community.⁶ In April 1959, Senegal and the French Sudan joined together to form the Mali Federation, named after the great empire of the fourteenth century. The federation was not successful, and in August 1960 Senegal seceded and became independent.

Senegal in Independence

Since 1960, Senegal has continued to prosper, although recent signs of economic stagnation have somewhat stunted its growth. The country has been governed continuously by the Socialist Party since gaining independence, although numerous other political parties are permitted.

Senegal's first president was Leopold Senghor. French-educated and a world-renowned poet and writer, President Senghor was Senegal's representative to the French National Assembly from 1946 to 1958, when Senegal petitioned for independence. Initially adhering to France's parliamentary form of government, President Senghor was a driving force in every decision made in Senegal. He did not allow other political parties until 1976, when he stipulated that there could be three political parties in Senegal, each adhering to a specific ideology based on

⁴Department of the Army, *Area Handbook for Senegal*, Washington, D.C.: DA Pamphlet 550-70, 1974, pp. 28-31.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶*The Europa World Yearbook*, Vol. II, 1991, p. 2302.

his perception of the developing political factions extant at the time.⁷ The liberal democratic faction became the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS); the Marxist-Leninist faction became the African Independence Party (PAI); and the centrist democratic socialist faction of Senegal remained the Socialist Party (PS). In 1978, Senghor authorized the creation of an additional right-wing party, the Senegalese Republican Party (MRS). President Senghor's political popularity continued throughout his term, with little public dissent, and he remained unchallenged as president until he resigned in 1981 and turned over control of the government to his prime minister, Abdou Diouf.

President Diouf, although from the Socialist Party as well, instituted sweeping changes designed to improve governmental administration and living conditions. He extended the process of political liberalization by removing restrictions on political party activity and encouraging broader political participation; reduced government involvement in the economy; and widened Senegal's diplomatic involvement, particularly within the region.⁸ He was re-elected in 1983 and 1988 and, in all likelihood, owing to his present popularity, will again be re-elected during the 1993 elections.

U.S. Relationship and Strategic Interests

In the past, U.S. relations with Senegal have been somewhat restrained, partly because of Senegal's close relationship with France. After Senegal became independent in 1960, there was a period of transition during which the French remained actively involved in Senegalese affairs, primarily in an advisory capacity. Even today, the French continue to have a significant military presence in Senegal.⁹ As a result, many of the Senegalese bourgeoisie, having been educated by the French and inculcated with the "French" experience, were sympathetic to French requests and generally opposed to those who opposed the French. At the time of Senegal's independence, U.S. relations with France had been deteriorating because of lack of U.S. support for the French conflict in Indochina and the subsequent U.S. intervention there.¹⁰

⁷Banks et al., 1990, p. 557.

⁸U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Senegal*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1991, p. 2.

⁹According to the political officer in the U.S. Embassy, Senegal, the French have not been in favor of U.S. involvement in Senegal. They believe it is an encroachment into an area traditionally reserved for them.

¹⁰Relations with the United States in the 1960s chilled to a point that France requested that all U.S. military forces leave their soil by April 1, 1967. In doing so, the United States rendered many of the facilities they had occupied unusable, thereby creating an even greater chasm with France, and thereby with Senegal.

Having fought alongside French units in Indochina, Senegal also resented U.S. involvement in Vietnam, particularly since the United States supported a Vietnamese government that ousted the French. In addition, during the early years of independence, the United States and Senegal were in opposition on several key United Nations issues, such as Chinese representation in the United Nations and the condemnation of Portuguese military incursions into southern Senegal, both of which were not favored by the United States.¹¹

Today, however, the relationship between the two countries has improved considerably. The Diouf government is basically pro-Western and closely associates itself with the United States on a range of issues, nonetheless continuing its close ties with France. U.S. aid to Senegal is designed to assist the country in further establishing its thriving democracy while simultaneously strengthening the professionalism of its military and ensuring access to key facilities in the country. The two most important facilities are the deep-water port at Dakar and the international airport in that city, which is currently designated as an emergency landing site for the U.S. space shuttle.

Although, prior to 1980, U.S. aid to Senegal was minimal, it grew steadily during the Reagan Administration. In the 1990s, partly in gratitude for its participation in the Gulf War and involvement in the peacekeeping effort in Liberia, the United States forgave \$47 million of Senegal's debt and took steps to ensure that it receives a sizable share of the material being removed from Europe as the U.S. Army decreases in size there.¹² In a situation where the military aid program for all of Africa is declining in fiscal year 1993, Senegal's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and IMET program are growing, to \$1.105 million.¹³ In addition, Senegal in all likelihood will receive the lion's share of Africa's discretionary funds used for developing democracies (\$41 million) in FY 93.¹⁴

Defense and Development Needs

Senegal is known for its progressive, democratic government. On a continent where hunger and starvation are a way of life for most, no one in Senegal is going hungry.¹⁵ However, despite Senegal's successes in many areas, the country continues to have areas of concern, both internally and externally. The

¹¹Department of the Army, 1974, p. 223.

¹²Interview with SAO in U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

¹³U.S. Department of State, FY 1993, p. 9.

¹⁴SAO, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

¹⁵Interview with U.S. Embassy political officer.

periodic strikes and riots that occur in Senegal serve to remind the government of the fact that, even with over 30 years of progress and democracy, the fundamental living conditions of its people must be improved if it is to maintain both its legitimacy and stability. Without resolution, some of these areas may soon serve to destabilize the progressive conditions in Senegal.

Senegal's External Threats

At one time or another since 1960, Senegal has had disputes with all its neighbors. These disputes have ranged from disagreements over the citizenship of a particular class of people to virtual combat over the alignment of a border. Oddly enough, whereas Senegal in the past has had disputes with former colonies of Portugal (Guinea-Bissau) and Britain (The Gambia), relations today seem to have normalized. Ironically, Senegal's biggest current external rivalry is with another former French colony, Mauritania.

Mauritania and Senegal have regularly disagreed on the precise boundary between their countries, resulting in a number of disputes generally surrounding the status of land, crops, and people to the north of the Senegal River. On several occasions, the countries' militaries have traded artillery fire, and several civilian casualties have occurred—on both sides.

Most recently in 1989, Mauritania mysteriously "disowned" some 60,000 members of the Maurs ethnic group and exiled them to Senegal. Left with no recourse, Senegal petitioned the United Nations for resolution, whereupon the United Nations implemented a program to ensure that these exiles were fed. However, this program ends in December 1992.¹⁶ It is expected that Senegal will then have to assume responsibility for the exiles, which may ultimately heighten tensions once again between the two nations.¹⁷

Internal Unrest—the Casamance

Senegal has had a long-standing dispute, sometimes expressed in violence, with a small group of insurgent separatists in its southern district, the Casamance. The Casamance is virtually separated from the majority of Senegal by The Gambia, a sliver of land roughly 30 miles on each side of the Gambia River that extends 200 miles into Senegal from the Atlantic Ocean, a point made regularly

¹⁶The program has been extended.

¹⁷Interview with U.S. Embassy political officer.

by dissident Casamancais when they complain of the lack of attention they receive from the government.

The Casamance is distinct from the remainder of Senegal in a number of ways. First, whereas most of Senegal has an arid, quasi-desert environment, the Casamance is fertile and forested. Whereas the Wolof tribe is the largest ethnic group of Senegal (43 percent), Casamancais are descendants predominantly of the Diola. Whereas many in northern Senegal speak French as a second language, Casamancais speak Portuguese. Whereas almost 90 percent of the population of Senegal are practicing Muslims, the Casamancais are mostly Christian or animist. And whereas northern Senegal needs the Casamance for the benefit of its crops and fertile lands, a faction in the Casamance does not perceive that it needs Senegal.¹⁸ After World War II, a faction in the Casamance, which grew into the *Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance* (MFDC), assisted the emerging government of Senegal in its move towards independence, ostensibly in return for autonomy and land rights. However, according to MFDC leaders, these promises never materialized, and this breach of faith has resulted in a small separatist movement that exists there today.¹⁹

Beginning in the early 1980s, the MFDC became more militant and assumed many of the characteristics of a terrorist organization—random bombings, hit-and-run tactics, and harassment and intimidation of the local populace. Early on, the Diouf government responded by deploying the *gendarmes*'s (military police) Intervention Unit to suppress the attacks. However, despite increased military and police presence in the region, the MFDC continued its attacks on government officials in its struggle for autonomy.

The size of the movement has remained relatively small, around 300 by official and media reports,²⁰ leading many to believe that it does not have popular Casamancais support. In 1990, Dakar appointed a military governor for the area and provided military units for eliminating the threat once and for all. However, while the governor has taken a basically militant approach in attempting to resolve the issue, military personnel involved in the conflict have, as one observer has argued, no clearcut guidelines on how to operate in the Casamance, have not been sufficiently trained in counterinsurgency techniques, and do not have sufficient understanding of the enemy they face—their own countrymen.²¹

¹⁸Department of the Army, 1974, various pages; *The Europa World Yearbook*, 1991, pp. 2302–2306; Embassy political officer.

¹⁹Da Costa, Peter, "The Secessionist South," *Africa Report*, January–February 1991, p. 22.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 22.

²¹Political officer, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

In March 1991, President Diouf established a dialogue and achieved a fragile ceasefire with the MFDC.²² It is clear that there are no easy solutions: The MFDC wants independence and is prepared to fight toward this goal, regardless of whether the majority of the Casamance supports it or not. Casamancais have neither the experience nor institutions in place to govern. But beyond this, the government of Senegal does not want and cannot afford for the Casamance to secede since the majority of the country's agriculture is in the region.

So this fragile peace, while mutually beneficial, will not last without some additional forms of governmental intercession.²³ Indeed, over the past ten years, hundreds of people have been killed, imprisoned, and tortured. Atrocities have been committed by both the government and the MFDC. What is clear is that there is a tremendous difference of opinion among the various complainants, and the longer the government takes to resolve the issue, the longer it runs the risk of further degrading its legitimacy and alienating more Casamancais.

Socioeconomic Ills


President Diouf inherited a country in economic stagnation. Although he has been able to make broad improvements in Senegal's social and political position in Africa, he has not been able to reverse the country's stagnant economy despite the implementation of economic austerity measures and economic liberalization. Therefore, although in real terms GNP increased during the 1980s, per capita GNP registered no growth (see Figure 3.1) and actually declined by an annual average of 1.2 percent from 1987 to 1989. The drop in annual income growth can be attributed in large part to population growth, which exceeded 3 percent per year.²⁴ But Senegal's actual financial position is also in decline, because an ever-increasing amount of its foreign credit is being used to acquire food for its people. Decreases in export demand, an inability to increase agricultural production to the level of self-sufficiency, lackluster improvements in education, and unyielding labor unions that resist modernization have only served to exacerbate the country's socioeconomic problems.

As a result of the lack of improvement in either the economy or the living conditions of the people of Senegal, the country has experienced a large number of strikes and riots during the past ten years. The Diouf Administration has reacted decisively during these times of unrest in the belief that failure to do so

²²A new cease-fire was signed in July 1993.

²³Political officer, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

²⁴*The Europa World Yearbook*, 1991, p. 2305.



SOURCE: Compiled from *The Europa World Yearbook*, 1980–1987

Figure 3.1—Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP) and Income Growth in Senegal

would adversely affect peace and security. In 1987, following a strike by the national police, Diouf immediately fired 20 percent of the force and suspended the remainder—using the *gendarmerie* and the military to maintain order while he opened a dialogue in an attempt to redress some of the policemen's grievances. In 1988, following the elections, a strike and riots instigated by the opposition PDS, who alleged fraud by the ruling Socialist Party, resulted in the arrest of the party leaders and a declaration of a state of emergency.²⁵

In a virtually brilliant move toward interparty consensus and cooperation, President Diouf recently appointed the leader of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade, as his minister of state. In 1991, during a transportation strike, President Diouf brought in the army to drive the buses until the strikers returned to work, resulting in almost no loss in public service. Also, student riots in 1984 and in 1988 to protest lack of employment opportunities for graduates resulted in the government's pledge to take measures to improve the problem.

²⁵*The Europa World Yearbook*, 1991, p. 2302; Banks et al., 1990, p. 556.

President Diouf's basic position regarding conflict resolution is that the first step involves the willingness on the part of the parties involved, of which the government is always one, to open and sustain a dialogue. This willingness is evident in the president's approach to internal problems with workers and students, with separatists in the Casamance, with his neighbors—particularly in Mauritania, The Gambia, and Liberia—and even with the political opposition. To date it has proven extremely successful. However, by the end of 1992, the president will also need to match actions with words as troubles along the northern border and in the southern district both come to a head in December.²⁶

The Armed Forces of Senegal

Senegal's military is a mostly volunteer force composed of an army, air force, navy, and *gendarmerie*. It consists of about 12,000 personnel with the majority (almost 90 percent) found in the army and *gendarmerie*. This represents a growth in the armed forces of about 50 percent over the last 15 years.²⁷ The president is the commander-in-chief, and there is a civilian minister of defense. Former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces LTG Mamadou Seck is an IMET graduate and is strongly pro-Western and pro-United States. His decision not to retire, despite exceeding the mandatory retirement date, has caused some consternation among the upper echelons of the Senegalese government but is not anticipated to destabilize either the military or the country. Indeed, Seck did retire in July 1993 and was succeeded by General Kieta.²⁸

The Armed Forces of Senegal have a distinguished reputation in the region as a well-disciplined and, if necessary, lethal force. The Senegalese army has a long tradition of service throughout the world. Formed by the French in the 1850s as the *Tirailleurs Senegalese*, they were well known in Africa, during both world wars, and in Indochina as a fearless and extremely capable force. Upon Senegal's achieving independence in 1960, the army retained many of its French characteristics and, in some instances, retained French advisers and commanders in a transitional capacity to ensure that the force developed into an appropriate military.²⁹ Even today, much of its training, equipment, and support is from the French. Indeed, France provides more military aid to Senegal than any other country³⁰ (although Germany and the United States have begun to play

²⁶UN support for the Mauritanian refugees expires on 31 December 1992. In addition, the Casamancais separatists regard Christmas as their anniversary of their movement.

²⁷Department of the Army, 1974, p. x.

²⁸SAO and deputy chief of mission in U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1 July 1992.

²⁹Department of the Army, 1974, pp. 20 and 335.

³⁰U.S. Department of State, 1991, p. 4. The United States ranks third in aid to Senegal.

significant roles), maintains a presence of over 1,300 marines in-country, and conducts annual exercises with the army in Senegal. More recently, Senegal's army served with distinction in the Gulf War in 1991 and even now is in Liberia as a major, stabilizing component of ECOMOG.

The major combat units of the army include the following battalions: six infantry, one commando, one airborne, one armor, and one artillery. Combat service support capabilities are contained in one transportation battalion and communications, supply, medical, and maintenance companies. Five of the infantry battalions are deployed throughout the country, one per district. The remainder of the army is stationed in or near Dakar.³¹ The military has the principal mission of defending Senegal against external or internal aggression. However, other missions include search and rescue, medical evacuation, coastal surveillance, and assisting in the development of Senegal.³²

Senegalese military engineers are renowned for their development efforts and regard such efforts as their single most important mission.³³ They constitute two construction battalions and an engineer school. One battalion is deployed throughout the country, and the other is located near Thies. They are very active in civic action projects, many of which are U.S.-funded, and have contributed significantly to infrastructure improvements in the country through construction and renovation of roads, schools, and medical and dental clinics. They are also currently involved in a multiyear U.S.-funded project to construct a naval base at Elinkine in the Casamance district and have been involved in the planning process for the construction of a canal to transport fresh water from the Senegal River in the north to Dakar.

The military medical department comprises over one-third of the total medical capability of the country. As a result, most medical facilities in Senegal are manned by both military and civilian doctors and treat both civilian and military personnel. In addition, Senegalese military medical teams are periodically sent to the more remote areas of Senegal to provide medical treatment in the absence of civilian doctors.

Overall, the military is well organized and postured to assist the government in the maintenance of order and development, as well as to ensure the territorial

³¹U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1992 *Security Assistance Program*, and SAO.

³²*Ibid.*; director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces; Senegalese Engineer School representative.

³³Senegalese Engineer School representative. The importance that the engineers place on development is shared by the director of operations for the Senegalese Armed Forces. He sees the engineer as fundamental to development in Senegal and believes that the president places the same significance on engineers—based on the fact that Diouf's special assistant is an engineer.

integrity of the country. The force is predominantly equipped with French equipment that is at the point of deterioration and will soon have to be replaced. The engineer battalions were issued U.S. construction equipment during the 1970s, much of which is now close to or beyond salvage. Yet, they continue to fabricate parts to keep them running. Medical clinics are getting some necessary relief from drawdown equipment coming out of Europe. And, due to Senegal's participation with ECOMOG,³⁴ the army is receiving millions of dollars in excess U.S. trucks, jeeps, communications equipment, weapons, soldier support items, and ammunition. How its armed forces train for the future will foretell the success of Senegal in its development efforts, because the military is an essential element of Senegal's development.

Host-Nation Training Goals and Requirements

Senegal's military training goals and its use of U.S. military training are designed to support and complement the development of its armed forces. The program is well thought out. Soldiers designated for training in the United States are programmed by the armed forces joint staff two years in advance. The military leadership strives to pick the best-qualified personnel to represent their country in the United States. The training for those military personnel selected is closely associated with the follow-on assignment of that individual, and the single most important training goal for the Senegalese armed forces is "to get the right soldier the right training at the right time."³⁵ U.S. training, then, becomes a component of the Senegalese soldier's career development, in the same way that the basic, advanced, command and staff, and senior service courses are critical to the career progression of U.S. officers.

Using IMET funds, the Senegalese military recently procured six language labs to improve the English proficiency of the military. Labs have been or are being installed in Dakar, Thies, Saint Louis, and Kaolack and will provide the capability to simultaneously teach 110 students. The military has also sent 16 personnel to the United States since 1987 to receive training in English-language-instruction techniques. The Senegalese did this because they realized they were wasting a considerable amount of their limited IMET grant funds in long courses of English-language instruction in the United States. Teaching English to prospective students in-country enables them to use IMET funds more efficiently. Also, the military recognizes that English is rapidly becoming the universal

³⁴Senegal is no longer a member of ECOMOG, although it is still receiving equipment originally requested to support the operation.

³⁵Director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces.

language of peacekeeping, and since they envision Senegal participating in multinational peacekeeping efforts, they will need to be fluent in English. Indeed, the Senegalese government has also recently seen the importance of English to future development and has made English instruction compulsory in secondary schools.

Early on, Senegal recognized that sending young officers and soldiers to the United States for training resulted in cultural overload: The individuals were not mature enough to live and operate in the culturally diverse and dynamic environment of the United States. As a result, the military leadership began to get more involved in the selection process by ensuring that older, more mature officers and soldiers, usually of higher rank, were selected for courses. They began to move away from using the U.S.-offered basic courses (because they usually were attended by younger officers) and began concentrating on higher courses of instruction.³⁶ In 1986, they opened the equivalent of an Infantry Officer Basic School to provide instruction to their junior officers themselves. Today, training support from others outside Senegal is required at higher institutions, such as advanced courses and command and staff and senior service colleges, and in technical matters, such as engineering, computer science, and medicine. Military leaders have also begun to take more interest in postgraduate studies and in defense logistics and resource management programs.³⁷

A fundamental problem, however, lies in the fact that over 45 percent of the armed forces is under 20 years of age.³⁸ So, to provide the type of training that enhances military tactical and technical proficiency while maintaining Senegal's desire not to culturally overwhelm the younger soldiers (as happens in the United States), more in-country training is required.

The U.S. Training Response

U.S. training objectives in Senegal support its Security Assistance goals there. They are

- To seek to encourage and support stable democratic institutions in Senegal—elections, independent press, religious freedom, and respect for human rights.
- To promote economic recovery and development in Senegal.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1992 *Security Assistance Program*, and SAO.

³⁸Director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces.

- To encourage a pro-U.S. orientation of the Senegalese armed forces.
- To ensure continued U.S. access to Senegal's ports and airfields.
- To support Senegal's peacekeeping role.
- To support and foster a disciplined Senegalese military responsive to civilian authority.³⁹

The security assistance officer (SAO), in conjunction with the Senegalese Armed Forces headquarters and the Embassy staff, develops a training program to support Senegal's training requirements and priorities. The primary SAO objectives for Senegal are to provide training that enhances the armed forces' tactical and technical proficiency and logistical and managerial competence, to build rapport between the two armed forces, and to provide an understanding of U.S. culture.

Prior to 1980, 49 Senegalese students had been trained in the United States. That number doubled during the period 1981 to 1985 and almost tripled from 1986 to 1990. In the 1990s, Senegalese training in the United States seems to be averaging around 30 students per year (see Table 3.1).⁴⁰

In order to have an effect on Senegalese training needs and deficiencies, the SAO has aggressively pursued other, in-country training means, including employment of Mobile Training Teams from Europe and the United States, utilization of naval resources such as the West African Training Cruise (WATC), and participation in deployment-for-training exercises by both active and reserve component engineer and medical units. In addition to funding as a result of Presidential Determination 95-2 in November 1991, which provided almost \$15 million in U.S. military drawdown materiel from Europe to Senegal, the SAO has

Table 3.1
U.S. Training in Senegal

Type of Training	1950 to 1980	1981 to 1985	1986 to 1990	1991	1992	1993
Students	49	96	134	31	31	30
MTTs					6	
Exercises			1	2	5	

³⁹U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1992 *Security Assistance Program*.

⁴⁰*Defense Security Assistance Agency*, 1990; GAO, 1987; U.S. Department of State, FYs 1990-1993; SAO, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

pursued other methods, including reobligation of unused funds from other countries, the African Coastal Security program, Civic Action program funds, and Military-Humanitarian Action funding. The primary purpose of this action has been to show how the Security Assistance Program can indeed support Senegal's development needs. The most telling statistic about the increase in training and Security Assistance activity in Senegal is the increase in man-days directed to the effort from the last quarter of fiscal year 1991 to the first quarter of fiscal year 1992—from 90 man-days to 2,307 man-days.⁴¹

All parties concerned—the SAO, U.S. trainers, and the Senegalese—have agreed on the method of conducting in-country training. Each U.S. soldier is paired with a Senegalese soldier. They work together in an attempt to improve both that single soldier's capability as well as to provide him the capability to pass the knowledge on to other soldiers in his unit. This type of training is remarkable in its difference from the French method of training. The French advisers come in and tell the Senegalese on what they will be trained; they do not solicit the Senegalese training needs. Then they conduct the training. Rarely is there any testing, and the French never conduct live-fire training. They also do not associate with the Senegalese during training breaks. The U.S. style of training is much more interactive and, in the Senegalese view, more acceptable.

The U.S. trainer and soldiers come to the Senegalese and first ask where training is required. The Senegalese and the U.S. soldiers then discuss training approaches and agree upon intended outcomes. During the training, the U.S. soldiers live and eat with the Senegalese soldiers. Senegalese soldiers are trained to specific standards, and, within the ability of the Senegalese to provide the ammunition, live-fire and qualification exercises are often conducted.⁴²

Mobile Training Teams

Senegal has received several MTTs during FY 1992 designed to assist in developing its military or in preparing soldiers for peacekeeping duties in Liberia. Most MTTs have been small, one- or two-man groups of subject-matter experts in an area that the Senegalese military has requested support in. In keeping with the SAO's primary goal to improve the Senegalese military's maintenance and supply capability, most MTTs focus on training the trainer and the user in these areas. For instance, three MTTs have trained Senegalese soldiers and sailors on vehicle and boat maintenance—particularly preventive-

⁴¹SAO, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

⁴²Discussions with various Senegalese officers.

maintenance procedures (an area that has up to now seemed foreign to the Senegalese military). In addition, two MTTs have provided training on stockage and requisition procedures, and have attempted to assist the army in establishing a repair-parts account. Finally, in preparation for peacekeeping in Liberia, the U.S. Air Force provided an MTT to provide training on airload procedures aboard cargo aircraft.

The 3rd Special Forces Group, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, has taken an active role in assisting the SAO with the development of training programs and has offered its services as often as practicable. The single constraint seems to be on budget. However, it has provided personnel to film the area, in order to prepare an informative film on Senegal and the environment and culture in which U.S. trainers who deploy there will find themselves, and it is looking for cheap methods of deploying teams to assist in construction and medical training, such as hitching rides on ships with scheduled port calls in Dakar or aboard periodically scheduled U.S. Air Force flights that depart Charleston, South Carolina, en route to Africa.

Exercises and Deployment for Training

Both the National Guard and the 3rd Special Forces Group have actively sought opportunities to conduct joint and combined exercises with the Senegalese military. During the past year, the group participated in an exercise with the Senegalese army designed to enhance Senegalese training in the following skills: parachute operations, airfield seizure procedures, use of a variety of weapons, and medical procedures (such as basic first aid). The National Guard has conducted two exercises during FY 1992, under the National Guard Bureau International Training and Assistance Program (ITAP), to work with the Senegalese military on construction projects and regional medical operations.

The cost of deployment to Africa is excessive and becomes exorbitant if the unit takes its own equipment. While it is generally recognized that the training benefits of these deployments are enjoyed by all—the U.S. and Senegalese militaries and the Senegalese civilians whose living conditions some of these projects affect—other, cheaper options will have to be explored if the U.S. Army is to continue to support these initiatives in the fiscally constrained future.

The annual WATC visited Senegal both in FY 1991 and FY 1992. This year, the USS *Manitowoc* from Norfolk, Virginia, called on Dakar from 28 June 1992 to 1 July 1992. During their port call, the ship's personnel, sponsored by the defense attaché, conducted training orientations with Senegalese counterparts on naval communications, engineering, and damage control. The training was conducted

by first having the Senegalese sailors and officers meet their U.S. counterparts; then both parties went to the Senegalese ship and reviewed Senegalese procedures and ship status; after that, the parties went to the *Manitowoc* to see how the U.S. Navy did the same thing. It gave each navy the opportunity to see how the other did similar types of tasks, such as fire control or onboard communications equipment repair. The training was designed primarily to build rapport, trust, and confidence rather than to impart or improve knowledge in some specific subject. At the same time, the Coast Guard element on the ship met with their counterparts to discuss search and rescue and coastal patrol procedures, and a 47-man Marine contingent gave training in amphibious and airfield takedown procedures. Overall, the training, conducted in conjunction with a port call, was a cheap and effective way to build rapport, trust, and confidence between the two navies.⁴³ Accompanying forces from the Coast Guard, Marines, and the Army were able to work quite effectively with their counterparts—the major obstacle being the lack of French-language expertise on the part of the U.S. participants.⁴⁴

Training or Security Assistance Accomplishments

The principal goal of the SAO is to build rapport with the Senegalese military and provide resources in return for continued access by the United States to key facilities in Senegal. He has attempted to instill a confidence in the U.S. willingness and ability to provide training and materiel to assist Senegal in its development. In this respect, he has been successful. The SAO has an excellent relationship with the Senegalese military, both at the junior-officer and senior-officer levels. And by his aggressive pursuit of additional funds to assist the military in training and the country in its development, he has shown that the Security Assistance Program can work.

Remarkably, the Senegalese training program should be viewed as more mature than many older programs. Since 1985, it has trained (or is training) 34 personnel in graduate-level military institutions in the United States. Such training has increased the familiarity of the more senior Senegalese military officers with U.S. tactics, techniques, equipment, and culture. Another 187 students have been trained in specific areas designed to enhance their careers in their specific branch. (See Table 3.2.) In all likelihood, given their headquarters' determination to

⁴³Defense attaché, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.

⁴⁴Personal observations and discussions with members of the ship's crew and the defense attaché.

Table 3.2
Training Provided to Senegalese Soldiers in the United States

Institution	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Military academies		2		1	1				
Graduate-Level Institutions									
Senior service colleges		2	2	2				1	1
Command and Staff Colleges	1	2	3	4	3	3	2	1	1
Graduate studies	1						1	2	2
Course									
Amphibious warfare			1		1	1	1		1
Armor	2		1	1	2	2		1	1
Artillery			2	1	2			1	1
Aviation		1	1	1	1	1			
Engineering	1		1	1	2	1		2	1
Finance		1			1	1		3	3
Infantry	23	4	4	5	9	7	7	8	
Intelligence	1	7	4	2		1			
Language training			4	4	4	2		2	2
Ordnance	3	2	1		3			1	
Quartermaster	5	2	1	1		1	3	1	1
Signal	2	2		1		1			1
Transportation			1	1			4	2	2

SOURCE: Security assistance officer, U.S. Embas. , Senegal.

select only the best Senegalese officers for training in the United States, many of these officers will indeed become prominent in the military at some point in the future. However, given the nature of the courses of study and the caliber of the personnel sent, the officers should also be competitive in civilian careers after they leave the service.

In addition to enhancing U.S. influence in Senegal, the CONUS-based courses provided to the Senegalese students have resulted in a base of knowledge that should improve both the armed forces and the ultimate development of the country. The question is, Has it shown any marked improvement in the development of the country or the professionalism of, and regard for human rights by, the armed forces?

Internal Development Improvements in Senegal

Before beginning a discussion of internal development in Senegal, it is important to note that the armed forces are a very small component of society there—less than 1 percent of the total population. The country has a five-year plan divided

into four basic levels of investment. The first level is designed to improve agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and water supply. The second level is designed to develop and promote energy, industry, and Senegalese craftsmanship. The third level is designed to promote tourism, trade, transportation, and telecommunications. And the fourth level is designed to address urban, health care, education, cultural, and youth development needs. The five-year plan programmed approximately 464 billion francs from 1981 to 1985 and 645 billion francs from 1985 to 1989.⁴⁵ So, there are several major development programs ongoing in Senegal that do not even involve the military. Indeed, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), itself with a \$30 million program for Senegal during this fiscal year, is prohibited by law from working with the host-nation military.⁴⁶

However, the military and the engineers, in particular, are simultaneously at the beginning and end of development in Senegal. The military develops the discipline and knowledge of young soldiers, again 45 percent of whom are under 20 years old. As these soldiers leave the service, they take with them knowledge gained in the army. Former military engineers become contractors and compete along with other civilian contractors for construction projects, both civilian and government. Medics and doctors leave the army to become medical practitioners in their local communities. Pilots leave the air force to become pilots on Air Senegal; aviation mechanics become mechanics with the same airline. And many senior officers, schooled by France and the United States in national planning and strategy, become important participants in the national and local governments.⁴⁷

Today, the military itself, with very little aid from the United States (around \$5 million over the last five years), has become very active in infrastructure development. Engineers have built or are building and renovating roads, medical and dental clinics, and schools around the country, and a navy base in southern Senegal. They do so either independently or with the assistance of U.S. engineers who deploy to Senegal to train with the Senegalese engineers. Doctors provide much-needed medical attention to people throughout the country. And soldiers in general provide President Diouf with a unique capability to restore services that are often disrupted by strikes. Military personnel, trained to drive and maintain military vehicles by the United States, France, and Germany, are

⁴⁵*The Europa World Yearbook*, 1984, p. 2342, and 1987, p. 2375. In 1984, 464 billion francs equalled approximately \$1.1 billion; in 1987, 645 billion francs equalled approximately \$2 billion. It is not clear how much of these funds was actually expended on development, if any.

⁴⁶Interview with USAID representative in Senegal.

⁴⁷Director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces; Senegalese Engineer School representative; SAO.

capable of operating any of the different types of transportation assets in the country—buses, trucks, ferries, boats, planes, and even trains.

Internal Defense

Senegal's infantry battalions are strategically deployed throughout the country, one per district, primarily for external security purposes and also as a stabilizing function: People are less ready to rise up in the face of an infantry battalion. However, with the exception of the Casamance, Senegal's infantry has not been used against its own people. Senegal's army is considered to be an indomitable force in the region and fully capable of defending its territorial integrity against any external attack, with the possible exception of Mali. Training by the United States recently has been designed to enhance an already capable force. Most infantrymen who return to the United States for infantry training also attend airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia. Recent MTTs have enhanced light infantry techniques—mainly in parachute and airfield takedown procedures—enabling the infantry to become more responsive to disorder in the Casamance and to be more effective in Liberia.

Until recently, the only forces used in the Casamance, the major area of civil unrest in Senegal, were the *gendarmerie*. While they represent almost 30 percent of Senegal's armed forces, and are engaged in a small but growing counterinsurgency operation in the Casamance, they are prohibited from being trained by Section 660D of the Foreign Assistance Act because they are considered to be police. More recently, after some criticism, the *gendarmerie's* human-rights record has improved, which may, in fact, be because they are an elite group with a strong tradition of service and recognize the detrimental effects of blatantly killing or torturing their own citizens. However, if improvements are to be made in human rights in the former French West Africa, then the *gendarmerie* will have to be trained. They are not a police force like the French *gendarmerie*. They are more like a military police unit whose primary responsibility is the internal defense of Senegal.⁴⁸ They have the capability to deploy to other countries (when invited) and intervene in unrest, and have been used in this capacity before. However, prolonging the situation in the Casamance only serves to further destroy Senegal's otherwise good human-rights record.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Interview with chief, Security Assistance (Africa Region), HQ USEUCOM.

⁴⁹Da Costa, "The Secessionist South," 1991, p. 23.

Senegal Summary

Training only facilitates development; it does not, in and of itself, improve living conditions. Training in Senegal is provided by a number of U.S. agencies and other countries. While improved coordination of training is both necessary and desirable between the various international contributors and, within the United States, between various agencies, any attempt to do so given the various political interests in Senegal must be considered as a long-term objective. However, with the full participation of a government dedicated to democratic development (as Senegal is), the types of training being provided to the military serve a useful and beneficial purpose. It is *constructive* in that it develops the military institution. It is *complementary* in that it assists in the development of infrastructure and results in the amelioration of some otherwise negative living conditions. And it is *supportive* in that it improves the knowledge base and discipline of future members of the civil sector.

Training in the United States is beneficial because of the interaction with other U.S. and foreign students. However, because of fiscal constraints, it touches only a small percentage of the target population. Expanded IMET, in which civilians can be trained as well, only makes the target population larger.⁵⁰ Therefore, innovative and aggressive approaches to training in Senegal itself serve the multiple ends of familiarizing U.S. personnel with the area and culture and familiarizing and training many more Senegalese with U.S. personnel, equipment, and tactics. More trained soldiers, sailors, and airmen, especially those who would not otherwise be provided the quality of training they get from U.S. trainers, result in a more professional military. This is assuming that the military wants or can take more training.⁵¹

Training enhancements in Senegal should be considered along the following four general vectors:

Increased In-Country Training. To increase exposure of more Senegalese military personnel to U.S. tactics, equipment, personnel, and culture, a more robust, long-term in-country training program should be instituted. At the same time, it would provide those U.S. personnel and units having a regional orientation the opportunity to maintain their readiness while achieving U.S. training objectives for the Senegalese military. Particular emphasis should be placed on combat service support subjects, such as construction, medicine,

⁵⁰The Armed Forces of Senegal are opposed to any program that educates civilians in lieu of the military, because it takes away from the funds available to the military.

⁵¹The Senegalese armed forces operations director is personally involved in all aspects of U.S. training offers and wants to ensure that each proposal supports their training goals and objectives.

transportation, maintenance, logistics, and civil affairs, to build on the fledgling strengths of the military and on counterinsurgency techniques in order to quell the unrest in the Casamance in the most peaceful and humane way possible. In particular, the number of engineers trained in the United States over the past five years does not support the importance that the Senegalese military seems to put on development.⁵² In-country training programs expose more soldiers and officers to detailed and intense training programs cooperatively developed by the Senegalese with the assistance of the SAO. If the Senegalese are reluctant to send more engineers to the United States, they may be more receptive to deployments of MTTs or TAFTs designed to provide more intense, long-term training.

Training Base. To facilitate continued U.S. training of the engineer battalions and cooperative construction projects of the nature described in this case study, consideration should be given to negotiating with the government of Senegal the staging of a composite set of equipment from those units deactivated in Europe. Such staging would reduce the per-deployment cost of engineer and medical units that come to West Africa to train or build.⁵³ At some point in the near future, Senegal's engineer battalion will also require newer equipment. If development is to continue to be a priority (for Senegal and the United States), equipment and spare parts will have to be updated.

Counterinsurgency Training. Training of the *gendarmerie* and the other military units deployed in the Casamance on counterinsurgency techniques, as well as an ambitious development program in Casamance, will illustrate that Dakar is concerned about the welfare and legitimate needs of the Casamancais and may serve to turn the tide on a slowly growing separatist movement there. However, training of the *gendarmerie* will require a congressional waiver to Section 660D of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Expanded IMET. Expanded IMET has a place in Senegal. The Embassy has presented the new program to the government of Senegal and is prepared to implement it once it is more developed. On their own, the Senegalese military have taken advantage of Defense Resource Management courses and other programming and budgeting courses designed to give them some experience in U.S. methods of managing larger military institutions. However, other, broader issues are affecting the stability of Senegal that could be addressed through

⁵²There are other avenues of training (e.g., France), which may explain this anomaly.

⁵³The SAO has already begun the development of a project proposal that would result in a staging area for U.S. forces that deploy to Senegal. It considers sufficient space for approximately 50 personnel with equipment, at a cost of \$170,000. It does not consider the cost of a permanent pre-positioned material configured in unit sets (POMCUS)-type facility that could be used to store equipment during the time between deployments.

IMET-E, possibly cooperatively with other U.S. agencies, instead of only DoD, as currently limited by law. Beyond this, however, is the need to identify any IMET-E allocation separately and in addition to the current IMET program, or it will not be accepted by the current chief of staff. And strong consideration should be given to personnel exchange programs that allow government and civilian personnel the opportunity to experience U.S. methods of governance. Finally, exportable IMET-E programs will be accepted much more readily than requiring a government minister or civil servant to go to the United States for an extended period.

Senegal is a good example of an emerging democracy. It plays a major role in regional stability and has substantial influence and stature with its neighbors. The 1992 conference for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in Dakar in June 1992. President Diouf is this year's president of the OAU and has a major role to play in ECOWAS. However, Senegal has a continuing problem with a stagnant economy. To rise to the next level of stability and democracy, Senegal must find a way to refurbish its economy. A well-trained military can contribute, as a disciplined member of the federal government, toward national development and, at the same time, provide a stabilizing influence within both the country and the region during times of strife. With a relatively small program from the United States, the Senegalese military has been able to take advantage of the best the United States military has to offer, from branch advanced courses to the various military academies. In the years that follow, U.S. training should contribute to any success enjoyed by Senegal. Future training strategies of both military and civilian personnel must focus on those areas with which the country is struggling, such as its economic growth needs, its *gendarmerie*, and specific types of training and programs that will ultimately improve the living conditions and overall satisfaction of the Senegalese people.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The purpose of these two case studies has been to assess the effectiveness of training to foreign students and its impact on the internal defense and development (IDAD) of those students' countries. It is curious that, while U.S. national security interests relate to IDAD, none of the stated or perceived IMET training objectives does. A dichotomy in interests and objectives exists here because, whereas national interests are designed to result in *a more stable and secure world*, training objectives appear to be designed to *expand U.S. influence*. Taken in isolation, it is difficult to assess the contribution of training to overall increases in world stability or U.S. influence abroad. It is just as difficult to assess the success of training as a contributor to a country's development or the improvement of conditions in a country because of the diffuse nature of the environment. Clearly the instabilities that exist can be addressed *somewhat through training*. However, many, much more difficult issues must also simultaneously be addressed—by the affected nation and not by the United States. The United States can subtly persist in its assistance attempts, but it is the host nation that must commit itself to reform and development. Otherwise, the reforms and development will not last.

Key Findings

Republic of Liberia

To blame the U.S. training program for the failure of U.S. policy or the Liberian government would be ludicrous. It is clear that U.S. training did not have any impact whatsoever on preventing the downfall of the government. Neither the training nor the considerable investment in U.S. aid swayed the government's performance or provided the United States with any leverage during the 1980s. From the study of the country during the Doe years, some key findings emerge that should be considered in future policymaking.

The ethnocentricity of the Doe regime divested the government of its ability to provide for the needs of all its people and spawned the distrust and, ultimately, the loss of legitimacy that rushed its downfall. And there now exists a blatant disregard for life, particularly by the children in the NPFL. These may become the most important obstacles to resolving the almost three-year-old civil war.

Training did not effectively improve the professionalism or capabilities of the Liberian army. It had no understanding of the role that a military plays in a democratic government or of the military's role in countering insurgency. Leaders were consumed by corruption and lacked concern for the individual soldier. While most students who came to the United States seemed to be on a par with their U.S. counterparts, they were not successful in transferring either the quality of instruction or the quality of life found in the United States. Also, despite training in engineering, Liberian military personnel proved incapable of managing even small-scale development projects without considerable oversight from U.S. engineers. Likewise, MTT team chiefs were struck by the necessity to "start from ground zero" every time a team went to Liberia. Increased monitoring and influence in the future will be required to ensure that training contributes to the overall effectiveness of the military and development of the nation.

All that may have been achieved in the 1980s as a result of the huge expenditure of U.S. aid has been lost in the devastation of the last two years. Infrastructure improvements have been destroyed. Military and civilian leaders, who may not have been adequate in the first place, have been killed or exiled. Clearly, if the United States decides to become involved in Liberia again—and this must be considered at length first—it must not approach the devastating situation there in a business-as-usual manner. The reconstruction and training of Liberia will require extraordinary measures for many years to come. For details, see "Liberia Summary," pp. 26–33.

Republic of Senegal

Senegal is a progressive democratic society supported by a disciplined and capable military subject to civil control and direction. The military believes that one of its fundamental purposes is to participate in the development of its nation. To this end, the Senegalese military puts great emphasis on professionalism and civic action. The leadership manages closely the training provided by donor nations and ensures that it meets their needs and fits into their schedule. If the military is receptive to additional U.S. training, consideration should be given to providing more in-country training, particularly by the 3rd Special Forces Group, other U.S. combat support and service support units (engineering, medical, civil affairs, maintenance, logistics, transportation), and through more focused training in the United States on subjects that contribute directly to IDAD.

Ultimately, if training becomes institutionalized in Senegal, it may be appropriate to negotiate with the government to develop an austere, permanent or

semipermanent U.S. training staging base to more efficiently manage overseas deployments to West Africa. The installation would provide a base of operations for U.S.-deployed forces in Senegal as well as a projection point to other locations in Africa for civic action and humanitarian assistance. Also, because the U.S. reserve component may become the force of choice for these types of missions in the future, consideration should be given to maintaining a composite set of equipment for their use during operations there.

Increased interaction between USAID and the U.S. and Senegalese militaries will ensure more coordinated and capable civic actions in Senegal. USAID's goals in Senegal and those of the SAO and the Senegalese militaries coincide in some respects.¹ While USAID should continue to focus on initiatives that enhance and develop the civilian sector, the military may be the only capability available in certain districts because of the unsecure and, in some cases, almost uninhabitable areas of the country. Additionally, USAID's budget and the positive image of the popular Senegalese military assisting in the development of its nation will be received well by a citizenry in need of so much.

Senegal's socioeconomic problems require a separate assessment and quick action designed to redress the grievances of the people. Such action may require training in institutions outside the Department of Defense but must be accomplished if economic stagnation is to be reversed. The military's impact in these areas is minimal at best. The actions of USAID are, likewise, aimed at the margin. However, training of targeted key individuals in a program similar to IMET-E may have the best chances of success because it will enable them to be trained in areas that will improve the social, economic, political, and, ultimately, the institutional aspects of Senegal. For details, see "Senegal Summary," pp. 53-55 of this report.

Is IDAD Training Important?

What does training in internal defense and development do for African countries? In a situation where most countries in Africa have barely enough food to feed themselves and where many go without shelter and food, training in internal development provides an aspect of hope.

Through cooperative programs such as civic action, in which the host-nation military, working with the U.S. military, provides a service or a facility for the civilians in order to improve their immediate or long-term living conditions,

¹USAID's four basic country goals are population control, increased agricultural productivity, reforestation, and liberalization of markets. USAID representative, Senegal, June 1992.

training improves the host nation's ability to provide for its people. Training in the United States in engineering, medicine, signals and communication, and transportation provide improvements in the professionalism of the military. When the soldier returns home, he is more capable of responding to the needs of his people in a professional, competent way. And when he leaves the military, he has acquired a skill that serves to improve the community, if utilized.

Of course, there are some fundamental requirements for IDAD to succeed. First, the government must be committed to its success. While this may sound like rhetoric, it is clear that while Senegal is committed, Liberia was not. Corruption and ethnic discrimination by the government were clear signals that Liberia was not interested in improving the living conditions for more than a select few. In situations such as these, the United States must be prepared to take firm action to ensure that the host government clearly understands the consequences of lack of progress toward internal defense and development.

Second, if the military is to participate in IDAD, it must understand what its role and position in the government are and must abide by that understanding. Again, the contrast between Senegal and Liberia is extraordinary. Senegal's military believes that its fundamental role is to participate in the development of Senegal—not for its own betterment but for the betterment of the Senegalese. It also understands that it is only one of the many participants involved in IDAD there. From Senegal's perspective, training in management and professional skills serves to contribute immediately and ultimately to the internal defense and development of the country. With regard to Liberia, training to implement an effective IDAD strategy may be critical to its future.

Does IMET-E Have a Future in Africa?

Expanded IMET will ultimately enhance the training of selected individuals in Africa. Currently, in many countries, there is a poor understanding of the role and position of the military—both on the part of the military and the civilians in government. Human-rights and judicial reform are essential in a number of countries. Financial management and better management of the defense establishments of these small countries are critical.

However, as important as these types of programs are, the instruction in tactics, strategy, and other defense issues is just as important to African military leaders. In an environment where many of these militaries can hardly afford to train their personnel at all, the United States—grant IMET program provides them with some relief. These militaries will not be in favor of instituting a program for civilians, then, that takes away from that training capability. Therefore, the

IMET-E program must be separate and in addition to a country's regular IMET program if it is to succeed. Also, because there are clearly other educational needs that should be addressed as well in order for internal development to succeed, the scope of IMET-E should be increased to encompass them.

In addition to increasing IMET-E in scope, some additional improvement in how it is solicited in the country will also need to be made. At present, the SAO represents the IMET program to the country. If the intent is to gain support for attendance at schools or MTT sessions in-country by members of other agencies in that government, then broader participation by the U.S. Embassy will be necessary.

Will the Real Reason Please Stand Up?

An examination of the objectives of training foreign militaries reveals that there were significant differences in the effect on IDAD in the two countries studied (see Table 4.1). The difference is because training is only a very small part of the many components and factors that contribute to a successful IDAD strategy in a country. All agencies must be committed to taking appropriate actions, actions that show that the government is concerned for the welfare and improvement of its people. Military training may have a long-term improvement of such

Table 4.1
The Success of Training in Africa

Stated or Perceived Objectives	Liberia	Senegal
Congressional objectives		
• Establish mutually beneficial relationships	No	Yes
• Improve foreign self-reliance	No	Some
• Improve understanding of human rights	No	Unknown
Department of Defense objectives		
• Improve operational and maintenance capability	No	Some
• Develop expertise and systems to effectively manage the defense establishment	No	Yes
• Foster development of an indigenous training capability	No	Yes
• Promote military rapport and understanding	No	Yes
Military perceptions		
• Build military-to-military relationships	No	Yes
• Facilitate interoperability	No	Yes
• Gain influence	Some	Yes
Recipient's perception		
• Meet a financial need	Yes	Yes
• Provide quality training that is internally lacking	Yes	Yes

commitment in that it educates people who ultimately may move into positions of prominence and may remember the training they received. Or they may not. The burdens of trying to implement what was learned in the "pristine" environment of the United States may just be too difficult when a soldier or an officer returns to his home.

A review of Table 4.1 shows that there is some similarity in the U.S. objectives and perceptions. Congress, DoD, and those interviewed all indicated an interest in developing beneficial relationships. Both Congress and DoD indicate an interest in fostering self-reliance, although it is not clear that there are actual goals and milestones established for the development of a self-reliant military establishment that would result in the decline in U.S. training in that country. In fact, it may be counterproductive to instill self-reliance because it would negatively affect U.S. influence.

What is interesting about both the stated and perceived objectives in Table 4.1 is the difference in the success achieved in Senegal and Liberia. This difference points to the fact that other factors beyond training have significant influence on the success of IDAD in countries the United States seeks to assist. It also points to the need to better assess movement by aid recipients in directions supported by the United States. Perhaps U.S. objectives are overly ambitious and should be reconsidered as a component of a comprehensive assistance program rather than in isolation.

Indeed, current U.S. training objectives may be difficult to attain until a point of contention arises. For instance, it was not clear whether Senegal would stand up with the coalition during the Gulf War until it happened. Similarly, in the end, the Liberian armed forces did not do what the United States wanted or what was in their best interests and were destroyed by a numerically inferior force. And while *interoperability* can be assessed during combined exercises, it is not clear that a country will respond to the same threat to which the United States responds until the threat occurs. At best, the training (and equipment) provided by the United States does one key thing: It provides a service the host nation neither has nor is capable of providing because of a lack of resources or experience. Whether the result of providing this service will be one that is beneficial to the United States, however, is problematic.

A key difference between the objectives of the United States and those of the recipients seems to lie in whose interests the training is believed to serve. The recipient seems willing to cope with the stated, self-serving objectives of the United States in the interest of filling an institutional void with what it knows is a

high-quality "filler"—training paid for by the United States—as long as it does not interfere with that country's interests.

Perhaps the most cogent objective of training is stated in *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, wherein training is defined as the act of teaching "so as to make fit, qualified, or proficient."² If this definition were to be adopted as its primary objectives, then U.S. training to standard in tactics, professionalism, leadership, and technical courses would be provided to foreign militaries in order for them to be more capable against external enemies and internal subversive elements. Moreover, training to standard and its application within the host country can be measured more objectively than can the current objectives and policies governing IMET. As in the U.S. military, training would then improve the readiness of that foreign force. And, as in the U.S. military, training would enhance the professional development, leadership, and managerial expertise of foreign militaries, and through them the ultimate development of their countries.

Whereas seeking to improve a foreign military may result ultimately in not having to employ U.S. combat forces at some later date, attempting to focus on objectives that seek to obtain leverage or influence has only in the past resulted in accusations, resentment, and fears of infringement on a nation's sovereignty. With the dictionary's definition as the primary objective, as it is for U.S. students attending the same courses, the other "stated objectives and perceptions" may ultimately become results.

²Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1990, p. 1251, definition 3b of the verb *train*.

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